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The importance of financial institutions as pivotal for the economy is largely 
acknowledged. Since they provide specific services, such as issuing loans and 
collecting deposits, and perform a number of peculiar functions, including maturity 
transformation and risk diversification, banks and financial intermediaries are often 
referred to as “special”. However, the risks they face are special as well. Being 
extremely leveraged institutions, banks walk on a very thin thread and, considering 
that they are nowadays world-wide connected, instability can rapidly spread over 
the system, even affecting the real economy. Therefore, traditional economic rules 
are not entirely suitable for banks, which require a particular attention from 
regulatory authorities and academics. 
This thesis focuses on two areas of remarkable importance, namely financial 
stability and banking competition, and develops within three chapters, as explained 
below. The aim of Chapter 1 is to highlight the relevance of financial stability and 
competition, also asking why regulators are extremely concerned about the two 
topics. The second and third chapters, then, start from the above premises with a 
specific focus on the Italian system. This is the backbone of the thesis: Italy is full 
of specificities, sometimes difficult to understand completely. Nonetheless, it is 
desirable that these specificities are protected and encouraged, since, very often, 
they have proven to be a strength. 
More in depth, in Chapter 1 we review the main literature, both theoretical 
and empirical, regarding banking stability and competition.  
Ensuring financial stability is nowadays a fundamental in central banks 
schedule. Indeed, last decades have underlined that banking crises can be extremely 
costly and disruptive. Besides, financial turmoil is more and more frequent and has 
a systemic relevance. Therefore, noteworthy efforts have to be undertaken in order 
to avoid such adverse episodes. 
The negative influence of financial instability on the real economy is well 
established in literature since the “Great Depression”. However, the understanding 
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of stability has evolved over time, switching from a purely micro-funded definition 
to a more complex macro-prudential approach. This conceptual change has 
influenced the regulatory frameworks too, which now conceive the system in a 
more organic way, albeit not neglecting to control the risk at the single institution 
level. As a consequence, the methodologies for evaluating and measuring stability 
and risk have evolved as well, mainly following two lines. Particularly, the 
academic literature has developed, on the one hand, indices grounding on the 
measurement of risk at the bank level and, on the other hand, frameworks for the 
assessment of systemic risk. The topic is now at his very peak. 
In the second part of the chapter we focus on banking competition. We have 
noticed that, while stability is clearly recognized as a goal to achieve, conclusions 
about competition are not so definite. As a matter of fact, despite a competitive 
environment is traditionally considered as desirable for the market, because it 
involves positive outcomes for the economy, this is not entirely true for banking 
industries, which are characterized by a number of imperfections.  
In trying to disentangle the effects of banking competition on the economy, 
we have focused on two transmission channels, namely market power and 
efficiency. In this way we have also been able to evaluate the most widespread 
competition indices, which usually conjecture the existence of one of the 
aforementioned conduits. Then, we have moved on the direct evaluation of the 
aftermaths of competition in banking on some specific features, such as economic 
growth and monetary policy transmission. In both cases a certain level of market 
power sounds desirable, albeit with few exceptions.  
The chapter concludes with a section about the relation between bank 
competition and financial stability, in which the main theories have been reviewed: 
the “competition-fragility” theory, according to which competition drains banks’ 
market power and franchise value, hence harming stability; the “competition-
stability” hypothesis, which maintains that competition is likely to promote banking 
stability. Nevertheless, a more recent literature has evidenced that a third way is 
possible. Indeed, the two theories are not necessarily colliding, rather the two 
effects depend on the characteristics of the specific market. 
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In Chapter 2 we propose and test a new index for assessing banks’ insolvency 
risk. Alternative measures of bank stability and risk appear useful when market-
based indicators are not available, or traditional indexes derived from balance 
sheets variables are not suitable because of collinearity, endogeneity or not 
comparable data. This is the case of the Italian banking sector, mainly composed 
by local small non-listed banks, i.e. cooperative banks or BCCs, which operate in 
accordance with the principle of mutuality. Since BCCs’ activity focuses 
principally on their own members, it is likely that they act to maximize their value 
rather than profits. Consequently, market-based measures are not fully suitable for 
the Italian sector, as they would concern only a (small) part of the market. On the 
other hand, also common accounting measures constructed on profitability appear 
not appropriate. 
Our index, which we call BVDD, i.e. ‘book-value distance to default’, is based 
on the classic distance to default derived within the Contingent Claim Analysis but 
entirely constructed on book-value data. In a nutshell, we employ the book-value 
of assets and its volatility instead of the same values derived from market data.  
To test BVDD’s reliability, we employ two econometric approaches: a 
standard logit model, and a survival analysis through a semiparametric Cox model. 
Working on a sample of 863 Italian banks over the period 1996 to 2013, we find 
confirmation of its predicting power. In fact, banks with higher BVDD are less 
likely to default, and the evidence seems to be robust to alternative model 
specifications. Moreover, some insights about the Italian banking system may be 
inferred: big profitable banks with an adequate level of capitalization and a lower 
level of non-performing loans show a lower probability of default.  
Lastly, in Chapter 3 we turn to competition, assessing the degree of Italian 
banks’ competitiveness between 1989 and 2013.  
The Italian banking industry has evolved considerably over time. Since the 
‘80s, many boundaries have been removed (among them, branch limitations, credit 
quotas and the widespread public ownership), mainly in accordance with the 
European harmonization. Similarly to other countries, the process has led to a 
progressive consolidation of the market. At the same time, Italy has experienced a 
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progressive disintermediation towards a more service-oriented business-model and, 
in addition, the recent financial crises have deeply affected the system, hitting the 
most the biggest banks. As a result, banks have started looking for efficiency gains 
in order to compete in the new globalized market and, above all, to survive. 
However, the Italian banking industry has its own peculiarities, especially in 
terms of dimension and legal form of its intermediaries. As already mentioned, 
BCCs play an important role and, due to their specificities, enjoy a peculiar kind of 
market power, i.e. relationship lending. For these reasons, an analysis of the 
competition grade of the system seems of primary importance given the intense 
modifications that have taken place in Italy over the last decades, especially to 
understand if such transformations have played a role. 
In this chapter, we apply the Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982) and Shaffer (1989, 
1993) methodology to Italian data in order to estimate an index of competition, 
called λ, for the banking sector. Typically employed on time series, the 
methodology is here implemented on a panel. Specifically, we focus on dimensional 
groups, discriminating between big, medium, small and minor banks, as classified 
by Bank of Italy. In this way, we are able to observe both the evolution of the 
coefficient over time and the difference in competitive behaviours among different 
classes of banks.  
According to our results, between 1989 and 2013 the Italian banking sector 
has been characterized by a substantial degree of competitiveness. Moreover, the 
level of competition has shown an increasing trend. In detail, our estimates evidence 
a notable increase occurred in the first Nineties, which can be due to the 
introduction of the Second Banking Directive (Directive 89/646/EEC), and a 
contraction over the period 2007-2008, perhaps linked with the upcoming financial 
crisis. Furthermore, the results seem to confirm the existence of some market power 
enjoyed by smaller banks, since their level of competition is found lower compared 
with bigger ones. 




Banks, financial stability and competition 
1.1 Introduction 
Often referred to as “special”, Financial Institutions (FIs) are essentially 
intermediaries offering a wide range of services, including loans, deposits and 
payment services. Their peculiarity lies in the role they play in the economy, in the 
functions they perform, and in the risks they are exposed to.  
According to the classic theory of financial intermediation, credit supply – 
funded by deposit collection – is the core service provided by banks. By channelling 
capital from savers with surplus to borrowers with shortage in an environment 
characterized by information asymmetries, banks operate a number of functions, 
particularly size and maturity transformation, and risk diversification (Allen and 
Carletti, 2014). In addition, acting as “delegated monitors” (Diamond, 1984), FIs 
are able to screen and control borrowers’ and savers’ behaviour, thereby mitigating 
adverse selection, i.e. the probability of selecting the “wrong” borrower, and moral 
hazard, namely the possibility that a borrower becomes more risky. Consequently, 
banks allow a reduction in transaction costs, thus improving the allocation of capital 
and resource (Goldsmith, 1955; Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Patrick, 1966; King and 
Levine, 1993; Levine, 2005), and ultimately enhancing economic growth and 
productivity while reducing inequality and poverty (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 
2007).  
Besides, FIs (in particular depository institutions) are an important vehicle for 
the transmission of monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Peek and 
Rosengren, 2014) and are increasingly pervasive in providing payment services, 




As a result, financial institutions are exposed to a series of specific risks 
related to their business, among which liquidity risk, credit risk and interest rate 
risk that, if not properly managed, can lead to disruptive externalities. Therefore, 
given all their specialties, financial intermediaries are subject to specific rules 
aimed at avoiding both the interruption of the services and an excessive exposure 
to risks, that might end up with heavy consequences for the economy and society. 
Hence, the increasing interest of academic literature toward the banking sector 
seems justified.  
Since our research focuses primarily on stability and competition, in what 
follows we will try to clarify the importance of both and illustrate why further 
studies are needed to understand their nature. This chapter provides a literature 
review on financial stability and banking competition. Focusing on financial 
soundness, Section 1.2 evaluates the concept of soundness and its importance, not 
only for the financial system, but also for the economy as a whole (a survey of the 
methods used by the academic literature to measure financial stability is also 
provided). The heart of Section 1.3 is, instead, competition. Here we review the 
existing research about the link between the degree of competition in the banking 
sector and the real economy, with particular attention to the transmission channels. 
We also focus on a subject that has not been extensively evaluated yet, specifically 
the effect of banking competition on the monetary policy transmission. Section 1.4 
critically summarizes the main arguments about the long-debated relationship 
between competition and stability in banking, both theoretically and empirically. 
Section 1.5 concludes.   
1.2  The importance of financial stability 
1.2.1 Why is stability important? 
Ensuring financial stability is a primary objective of Central Banks, as also 
witnessed by the number of published Financial Stability Reports, where Central 
Banks illustrate risks and exposures in the financial system (Čihák, 2006).  
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Financial stability matters for many reasons. Basically, banking and financial crises 
are costly; as a matter of fact, distresses affect economic and income growth (e.g. 
Calomiris and Mason, 2003b) and involve public debt and fiscal costs (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2012). Further, they are increasingly frequent and, as the financial system 
is nowadays world-wide connected, instability of a country may quickly spread to 
other markets through the so-called contagion effect (Peek and Rosengren, 2000; 
Degryse and Nguyen, 2007).  
 
Figure 1.1 – Number of systemic banking crises started in a given year  
Source: Own elaboration on Laeven and Valencia (2012), pp. 24-26. 
Together with regulators and policy makers, a long-tradition strand of the 
literature dating back the “Great Depression” is trying to appraise causes and 
consequences of banking and financial distresses. For instance, in the 1930s some 
macroeconomists, such as Keynes (1931) and Fisher (1933), have argued that 
banking crises worsened the already critical situation during the Depression, 
because financial intermediaries transmitted their distress to the real economy 
through the monetary and lending channel. Later, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
have emphasized that bank closures and withdrawal by panicking depositors 
reduced the aggregate money supply, ultimately affecting the real economy also 
through the resulting increase in the interest rate. Similarly, a more recent empirical 
research by Calomiris and Mason (2003a) has evidenced that between 1930 and 
1932 a large part of the variation in the state level income growth in US can be 
explained by variations in the bank credit supply. 
1.2 The importance of financial stability 
 
8 
Although there was no clear-cut consensus about the mechanism of 
transmission, early literature has tended to recognize the negative impact of banking 
sector instability on the real economy. Nevertheless, a change in the perception of 
the relationship can be detected in some later studies. In fact, when the observation 
sample has shifted to more recent financial crises, empirical research has started to 
observe contradictory findings. For example, by evaluating data about 36 banking 
crises that affected 35 countries between 1980 and 1995, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2006) have evidenced that a banking crisis was followed on average by a 4% drop 
in output growth. However, the depression persisted only in the first year, and the 
real economy quickly recovered to its pre-crisis level. Therefore, they conclude 
that, while the aftermaths of financial disruption overwhelm the banking system for 
years, taking a long time to restore it, the repercussions on the real economy seem 
to be of short duration.  
Fairly different conclusions are drawn by Boyd et al. (2005), who have 
investigated the real per capita GDP losses associated with 23 banking crises 
occurred over the period 1976-1998. Their evidences are mixed. Whereas in 
developed countries a downturn was often not associated with any reduction in the 
real output growth, for some other countries they have estimated extreme losses 
bounded between 63% and 302% of real per capita GDP. Interestingly, major losses 
were related with crisis identified as non-systemic. Further, GDP losses were 
severely persistent. In fact, 19 out of 23 countries have recovered their pre-crisis 
level only 17 years after a turmoil. 
Such mixed results might be justified by considering that the above papers 
regard episodes occurred in various parts of the globe, often non-systemic, arisen 
either long after the Great Depression or long before the global financial crisis. 
Perhaps, their consequences are not even comparable with those two major events. 
Indeed, after the 2007-2009 turmoil, advanced economies experienced their 
“sharpest declines in the post-war era” (Group of Twenty, 2009). During the crisis 
and the following recession, worldwide markets saw an unprecedented number of 
banks bankruptcies, as evidenced in Figure 1.1, and a huge deterioration of wealth. 
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For instance, in 2009, per capita world GDP, which generally grows by about 2.2% 
per year, shrank by 1.8% (Claessens et al., 2013). 
In a noteworthy study on the social impact of financial distresses, Ötker-Robe 
and Podpiera (2013) have highlighted a series of massive consequences attributable 
to the global financial crisis. We recall their main results.  
Since 2007, output and employment conditions have deteriorated, although 
with significant differences across regions. The consequent weakening of aggregate 
demand and economic activity has severely hit labour market conditions around the 
world: about 28 million people have lost their jobs, bringing the total number of 
unemployed to around 197 million in 2012, among which about 40% were young 
people. The impact of the increased youth unemployment is even more critical for 
the economy: a young person who is inactive since his labour market entry is not 
able to build job experience, hence his possibility to be hired is worsened. 
Moreover, a long period out of work engenders skills erosion. In addition, besides 
its direct effects on the person, long-term unemployment affects social cohesion, 
with consequences for economic and social stability.  
In many countries the job market has been also involved by fiscal austerity 
programs, with cutbacks or freeze in employment and wages, and the average 
growth of real incomes has reduced by 50% between 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, 
after an initial increase, social expenditures fell in 2011, due to the drastic cuts in 
the public spending undertaken by many governments.  
The increase in unemployment and the deterioration of revenues have led to 
a sharp reduction in purchasing power which has contributed, on the one hand, to a 
further reduction in aggregate demand and, on the other hand, to a redefinition of 
the basket of consumer goods. According to the Life in Transition Survey (2010, 
cited in Ötker-Robe and Podpiera, 2013, p. 13), families in Europe and Central Asia 
have reduced their consumption of non-essential goods by relocating them to staple 
food. They also have cut health care, while, fortunately, investment in child 
education has been not affected much. Consumption reallocation has been stronger 
for low-income families. 
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As one would expect from the worst crisis in History, it has posed a milestone 
also in the economic and banking literature. A relevant research about financial 
stability has been conducted by Laeven and Valencia (2012) just in the wake of the 
global financial crisis (and the following European sovereign debt crisis). 
Identifying 147 banking crises, 218 currency crises and 66 sovereign crises over the 
period 1970-2011, they have evidenced larger output losses and increases in public 
debt for advanced economies compared with emerging and developing countries. 
At the median value, developed countries showed an output loss of about 33% and 
an increase in public debt of 21% of GDP, over the average values of 23% and 12%, 
respectively. Their explanation of the effect is that a deeper and more developed 
banking system makes a banking crisis more disruptive. Another interesting point 
concerns the use of the fiscal policy, which is typically countercyclical for major 
countries. In the authors’ view, expansionary macroeconomic policies, while 
supporting banks’ growth, encourage a gap between market and book value of 
banks’ equity, hence blurring significant needs for recapitalization, to the detriment 
of the systemic stability. 
1.2.2 Stability: what does it mean? 
Although both the economic literature and regulators tend to recognize that 
financial and banking stability are important to preserve, as already pointed out in 
Section 1.2.1, there is no clear consensus on what stability is, how it can be 
measured, and which is the best way to guarantee it.1 Besides, the three concepts 
are closely related.  
The notion of financial stability has evolved over time, often as a response to 
the occurred events. Before the sub-prime crisis, the prevalent view was mainly 
micro-prudential, and financial soundness was defined as the “smooth functioning 
of the components of the financial system (financial institutions, markets, and 
payments, settlement, and clearing systems)” (Čihák, 2006). The principal aim of 
supervisors and regulatory authorities was to reduce the individual risk of failure, 
                                                             
1 An interesting overview of alternative definitions of financial stability is provided by Schinasi 
(2016). 
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without any consideration of their impact on the system as a whole (Altunbaş et al., 
2017).  
The aforementioned ideas were behind the Basel Capital Accords, a series of 
guidelines on banks’ capital requirements introduced in 1988 by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, charged by the Group of Ten,2 plus 
Luxembourg and Switzerland. Briefly, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (better 
known as Basel I) settled an international standard of capital adequacy based on a 
risk-asset ratio approach. Each operating bank was enforced to maintain an amount 
of “capital related to different categories of assets and off-balance sheet exposure, 
weighted according to broad categories of relative riskiness” (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 1988, paragraph 28). The Accord was amended first in 1996, 
hence in 1999, when the new framework “Basel II” was proposed.  
A first version of Basel II was released in 2006, after a long debate. Its main 
objective was to set a more risk-sensitive treatment of banks’ risk, introducing the 
concept of ‘risk-weighting approach’, also fostering the adoption of banks’ internal 
risk ratings and external credit risk assessments. Although heavily criticized and 
debated, Basel II never became fully effective, because the sub-prime crisis broke 
out (Casu et al., 2015, pp. 208). 
The massive consequences of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy have 
suggested that financial stability could have different dimensions, hitherto ignored: 
a system cannot be considered as the mere sum of its parts, but also its macro-
prudential dimension has to be taken into account (Altunbaş et al., 2017). In a more 
complete view, the banking system can be interpreted as a network. The risk can 
arise not only from the individual institutions, but also from the relationships among 
them. Moreover, the network is exposed to exogenous shocks that can affect 
particular subjects, the relationships across them, and the system as a whole. In 
addition, spillovers between the financial sector and other markets may happen. 
Therefore, the need for a different notion of stability has arisen, as well as the 
                                                             
2 The Group of Ten, or G-10, is an international organization which reunites the ten largest 
industrialised countries in the World: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States (Casu et al., 2015, p. 208). 
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emergency of new macro-prudential policies focused on the economic system in its 
entirety.  
This new spirit led to Basel III, a new set of reforms approved by the G20 in 
2010. The renewed aim of the international regulators was the improvement of the 
banking sector’s resilience, enhancing its capability to counteract shocks, both 
endogenous and exogenous. In other terms, the reform, which is still being 
implemented, targets not only individual financial institutions – that have to be 
stronger, transparent, better managed and capitalized – but also systemic risks that 
can build up across the system as well as their pro-cyclical amplification over time. 
Concluding, a new definition of stability seems to be appropriate and, 
borrowing Schinasi’s (2016) words, “a financial system is in a range of stability 
whenever it is capable of facilitating (rather than impeding) the performance of an 
economy, and of dissipating financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as a 
result of significant adverse and unanticipated events”. 
1.2.3 Measuring stability 
As the conceptual identification of financial stability necessarily involves the 
way to measure it, two main categories of indicators can be defined. The first, based 
on the micro-prudential philosophy, aims to assess the idiosyncratic risk, namely 
the risk concerning the individual institutions. The second, grounding on the macro-
prudential idea, focuses on appraising systemic risk, which can be roughly defined 
as the risk of a crisis in the financial sector and its spillover to the whole economy 
(Acharya et al., 2017). 
a) Micro-prudential based measures: insolvency risk and probability of default 
Regarding the assessment of stability from a micro-prudential approach, 
empirical banking literature has proposed various methodologies, mainly following 
two strands: accounting-based measures and market-based measures. 
Accounting-based measures are ratios calculated from banks’ balance sheets 
data. Among them, as proxy for credit risk we recall loan loss provisions over total 
loans and loan loss reserves over total assets, where larger values are associated to 
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higher risk (Casu et al., 2015, p. 663). Another simple and widespread indicator is 
the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, often identified as a 
significant predictor of insolvency (Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989; Whalen, 1991; Barr and 
Siems, 1994; Jin et al., 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011).  
However, it is clear that a single ratio, although easy to formulate and 
interpret, displays just one side of a more complex structure: for example, a high 
non-performing loans ratio (which would indicate high riskiness of the loan 
portfolio) could be offset by risk diversification or an increase of the equity capital, 
which would leave the overall risk unchanged (Berger et al., 2009).  
One of the most common accounting-based stability indicators, the Z-score, 
is a broader insolvency risk index generally ascribed to Boyd and Graham (1986), 
Hannan and Hanweck (1988), and Boyd et al. (1993). Computed as the sum of 
return on assets and capital on assets ratios, weighted by the standard deviation of 
return on assets, the Z-score measures the distance of an institution from 
insolvency, where the latter is defined as a state in which losses are higher than 
equity (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Given that the index is positively affected by the 
level of profitability and capital, but negatively affected by the volatility of the 
return on assets, higher Z-score values indicate a higher level of bank’s soundness, 
or a lower likelihood to fail (Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Strobel, 2011; Lepetit and Strobel, 2013).  
The literature reports extensive use of the Z-score for both assessing 
individual banks’ insolvency risk (e.g. Boyd and Graham, 1986; Yeyati and Micco, 
2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beck et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014) and evaluating 
aggregate financial stability (e.g. Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; Molyneux et al., 
2014; Ijtsma et al., 2017). The popularity of this index is mainly due to its 
simplicity. In addition, relying just on accounting data, it can be calculated also for 
non-listed institutions, differently from market-based measures (Lepetit and 
Strobel, 2013).  
Nonetheless, the Z-score has its own weaknesses. As a balance sheet measure, 
its quality depends on the characteristics of the various accounting standards, hence 
cross-country analyses might be affected by differences in institutional structures 
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between countries (Chiaramonte et al., 2016). When employed together with 
indicators that are correlated with its own components (e.g. profitability indices), 
the Z-score might also give rise to spurious correlation (Beck et al., 2013). Finally, 
it could be unsuitable for comparing different types of banking institutions: for 
instance, as cooperative banks do not pursue profit maximization, they might be 
characterized by a lower ROA than, let’s say, commercial banks, which would 
imply a lower Z-score and a possibly wrong indication of lower stability (Čihák and 
Hesse, 2010; Coccorese et al., 2017).  
The alternative way to assess default risk for financial institutions adopts 
market-based indicators. There is a broad range of market-based models developed 
by economists, analysts, and FIs’ managers to assess default risk.3  
A large part of them relies on the Contingent Claim Analysis (CCA), a 
methodology proposed by Merton (1974) that defines the event of default as a state 
in which a firm is not able to cover its liability with its own assets value. Combining 
accounting and market data, measures developed within the CCA framework – such 
as the distance to default, the risk neutral default probability, and the expected 
default frequency –  are forward-looking and unlikely to be sensitive to internal 
policies. 
Although widely used in literature (e.g. Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Gropp et 
al., 2006; Akhigbe et al., 2007; Duffie et al., 2007; Campbell et al., 2008; Anginer 
et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2015), the Merton model has been strongly criticized for 
its major shortcomings and its difficulty in application (Hillegeist et al., 2004; 
Chan-Lau and Sy, 2007; Bharath and Shumway, 2008). For instance, it requires 
strong assumptions about the assets and liability structure and, by definition, it can 
be implemented only to publicly traded firms (Kealhofer, 2003; Chan-Lau and Sy, 
2007; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Guerra et al., 2016).4 
                                                             
3 A review of the most common credit risk management methodologies can be found in Crouhy et 
al. (2000) and Saunders and Cornett (2013). 
4 A more detailed description of this model can be found in Chapter 2. 
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b) Macro-prudential based measures: systemic risk 
The debate on how to measure systemic risk is in its full swing: since it is not 
completely understood, nor precisely defined, the identification of its dimensions is 
nowadays very challenging. For instance, Bisias et al. (2012) have surveyed 31 
frameworks appraising systemic risk. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Acharya et al. 
(2017), many of them lack in economic and theoretical foundation. 
Looking at the theoretically based literature, part of the research has 
developed a structural approach grounded on the contingent claim analysis. For 
instance, Lehar (2005) has employed a modification of the Merton’s approach on a 
sample of international banks over the period 1988-2002. The system is considered 
as “the regulators’ portfolio”, and the individual liabilities of each bank are 
modelled as contingent claims on the bank’s asset. Systemic risk is therefore 
defined as the probability that banks with total assets exceeding a certain threshold 
of portfolio assets fail within a certain span of time.  
Others have used market data to determine reduced-form indices for systemic 
risk. Huang et al. (2009) have identified systemic risk as the (theoretical) price of 
insurance against losses of the banking sector. By assuming a hypothetical portfolio 
consisting of the weighted average of the credit default swaps (CDSs) of each bank 
in the system, their index is calculated as the neutral risk expectation of portfolio 
losses. Tested on 12 major US financial firms, their indicator has been able to detect 
a peak of systemic risk between March and June 2008, presumably due to the 
financial crisis. 
Acharya et al. (2017) have proposed a micro-funded model in which the 
contribution of each financial institution to systemic risk can be measured by its 
SES, i.e. systemic expected shortfall, which represents the individual institution’s 
propensity to be undercapitalized conditional on the undercapitalization of the 
whole financial sector. SES increases with leverage and the marginal expected 
shortfall (MES), which is the firm’s stock return given that the market return is 
below its 5th percentile. In other terms, MES represents the extreme loss for the 
individual firm conditional to the market return in the tail of the system’s loss 
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distribution. Therefore, combining leverage and MES, SES can be estimated with 
a fair accuracy (their R-squared, calculated for estimates drawn on different 
samples, range between 20% and 60%). 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2017) have defined the value at risk of the 
financial system conditional on institutions being under distress as CoVaR. Hence, 
an institution’s contribution to systemic risk is the difference between the CoVaR 
conditional on the institution being under distress and the CoVaR in the median 
state of the institution. By testing their proposed index on quarterly data for 357 
U.S. bank holding companies over the period 1986-2010, they have evidenced a 
weak relationship between the individual institution’s VaR and its CoVaR. Thus, 
they conclude that a reduction of the idiosyncratic risk is not sufficient to avoid 
systemic risk contribution. Moreover, they have also pointed out that the major 
contributions to systemic risk come from bigger highly leveraged firms, operating 
with higher maturity mismatch. 
1.3 Do we need banking competition? 
Competition is traditionally considered by the economic theory as the most 
beneficial market structure, since it entails efficiency, innovation, quality of 
production, lower prices, as well as a better resources allocation and an increase in 
the aggregate wealth. However, it assumes some different facets when discussing 
banking and financial system. 
From a theoretical point of view, greater competition should involve banks’ 
higher efficiency, hence lower costs transmitted to the customers in the form of 
more favourable lending and deposit rates. Moreover, externalities would also 
impact positively the real sector, since a competitive banking sector should improve 
access to finance, hence fostering investments and innovation, also enhancing the 
overall product quality.  
Unfortunately, understanding the real benefits derived from an increase in the 
level of competitiveness in the banking sector is not that easy. Financial markets 
are characterized by frictions, such as asymmetric information and entry barriers. 
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Therefore, the traditional theorems of welfare are not directly applicable to the 
banking sector (Vives, 2001). In addition, the impact on the real economy is 
strongly influenced by the channel through which the effects are conveyed: whether 
an increase in the level of competition translates into an enhanced efficiency or a 
reduced market power matters. Finally, not only the ultimate effects are not clear, 
but all the alleged benefits need to be evaluated considering a potential trade-off 
between competition and stability. 
1.3.1 Competition and its transmission channels 
a) Competition and the market power channel 
The concept that an increased market power allows firms to enjoy excess 
profits goes back to the SCP (structure-conduct-performance) paradigm when, 
finding a direct link between industry concentration, price levels and profits in the 
American manufacturing industry in the late 30s, Bain (1951) ascribed the extra-
gains to the exploitation of market power or collusive behaviour. In other terms, the 
market structure, namely an oligopoly composed by 42 large-share firms, was 
affecting the final performance in terms of profits through the firms’ conduct.  
The idea behind the SCP paradigm is essentially a negative interpretation of 
the market power, which is considered detrimental for customers. However, the 
empirical assessment of the SCP hypothesis in banking leads to mixed evidence. 
While studies on US have noticed that banks operating in concentrated markets tend 
to charge higher loans rates and pay lower deposit rates (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 
1989; Hannan, 1991), other findings have been less supportive, evidencing a non-
relevant impact of concentration on banks’ profitability (Berger, 1995). 
To test the SCP hypothesis, empirical literature has largely employed a series 
of structural indicators, such as concentration ratios, number of banks, and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices (Casu et al., 2015, pp. 647-649). Although easy to 
compute, those indices are rather crude. An important drawback is that their 
reliability as measures of competition ends when the hypothesis that concentrated 
market encourage collusion is rejected. Furthermore, it is now recognized that 
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firms’ conduct is influenced by factors other than concentration and market 
structure. Consequently, using structural indicators to proxy competition may lead 
to biased estimates.  
The conduct of the incumbent can be affected by other mechanisms, such as 
the threat of new entries (Besanko and Thakor, 1992) or the general contestability 
of the market (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987; Bresnahan, 1989). 
Therefore, the actual degree of competition can be evaluated only through the direct 
observation of firms’ conduct. 
In line with these hypothesis, alternative measures of competition have been 
developed, many of which inspired by the so-called the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) literature5 (Coccorese, 2017). Among the others, two assess 
for the market power channel, namely the Lerner index and the Panzar and Rosse 
H-statistic. 
The Lerner index (Lerner, 1934; Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005; Maudos 
and Fernández de Guevara, 2007; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2010; Williams, 2012; 
Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014; Fu et al, 2014) measures the level of a bank’s market 
power as pricing power, i.e. the ability to set its price above the marginal cost. 
Calculated as the difference between the price charged by the bank and its marginal 
cost, divided by the price, the index is equal to zero under perfect competition, since 
firms are price takers. Contrarywise its value should increase with a decreasing 
level of competitiveness. The Lerner index can be calculated at a bank level and 
observed over time. 
The H-index has been developed by Panzar and Rosse (1977; 1987) as a test 
statistic for discriminating among different competitive markets. It has been widely 
employed in literature (e.g. Shaffer, 1982, 2002, 2004; Molyneux et al., 1994; 
Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Coccorese, 2004, 2009; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Al-
Muharrami et al., 2006; Bikker et al., 2007; Matthews et al., 2007). The indicator 
empirically assesses the impact of changes in input prices on firms’ revenues and 
grounds on the hypothesis of profit maximization. The H is derived by estimating 
                                                             
5 For an overview, see Bresnahan and Schmalensee (1987). 
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a reduced revenue equation and is equal to the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-
form revenues with respect to factor prices. On the assumption of long-run 
equilibrium, Panzar and Rosse (1987) have demonstrated that H is equal to or less 
than zero in a monopoly or perfect collusion, because firms set their prices with any 
regards to costs variations, due to the lack of competitive tensions. Conversely, it is 
equal to one with perfect competition, because a change in the level of costs is 
entirely translated into changes in the prices of output. In situations of monopolistic 
competition, the index lies between zero and one, since prices are only partially 
affected by cost fluctuations.  
The conjectural-variation methodology (Iwata, 1974; Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 
1982) also belongs to the literature field appraising for banks’ market power.6 The 
methodology estimates a conduct parameter through a simultaneous model of 
demand and supply. Although interpreted in many ways, the coefficient basically 
measures the distance between the current market conduct and the theoretical 
situations of monopoly (or perfect collusion) and perfect competition. For instance, 
according to Iwata (1974) the coefficient embodies the deviation in the industry’s 
quantity from the optimal quantity due to a change in the output of an individual 
firm. Otherwise, Bresnahan (1982, 1989) and Lau (1982) consider the parameter as 
the divergence of the perceived marginal revenue from the market demand. 
Some of the above-mentioned indices (CR-5, HHI, Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
and Lerner index) have been used by Casu and Girardone (2009) for assessing 
competitive conditions for the largest five European banking markets between 2000 
and 2005. The EU banking system underwent a process of consolidation, as showed 
by the CR-5 increase from 37.8% to 42.3%. A similar process has also involved 
individual countries, even though the banking markets in Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom have remained relatively disaggregated. Turning to market power 
measures, the average marginal cost has decreased over the period for the whole 
sample, with Italy and Spain showing the largest contraction. However, their 
marginal costs have persisted in being the highest. Similarly, the Lerner index has 
                                                             
6 A review related to this methodology can be found in Chapter 3. 
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grown over the period in all countries, hence confirming a decreasing level of 
competition. Again, for Italy and Spain the Lerner index has increased the most. 
Coherently, the estimated H-statistics depict monopolistic competition in all 
countries, with the highest competition in Germany, Spain and the UK, followed 
by Italy and France.  
These outcomes have been confirmed and extended by Sun (2011), who has 
detected monopolistic competition in the Euro area, the US and the UK banking 
during the period 1995-2009 through the H-index. The study also points out a 
convergence in the euro area due to the introduction of the EMU. Nonetheless, it is 
worth to notice that the H-index has been recently found to be inconsistent by 
Bikker et al. (2012) and Shaffer and Spierdijk (2015), since it is not able in 
identifying the degree of market power, neither through its sign nor its magnitude. 
Therefore, comparisons between values of the H estimated on different markets 
appear meaningless. However, the convergence across the European banking 
sectors from 2000 to 2014 has been validated by Cruz-García et al. (2017), with the 
Lerner index. 
b) Competition and the efficiency channel 
Linking for the first-time market structure and efficiency, the ‘quiet life 
hypothesis’ proposed by Hicks (1935) maintains that, as monopoly power grants 
managers to be free from competitive pressures, an increase in concentration should 
involve a decrease in efficiency, or, as lately pointed out by Leibenstein (1966), an 
increase in competition generates a reduction of inefficiency only when managers 
are properly motivated.  
Although dealing with efficiency, both theories have postulated the existence 
of the market power channel, as evidenced by Berger and Hannan (1998). Testing 
the quiet life hypothesis on a wide sample of 5,263 banks operating during the 
decade of the 1980s, they find lower cost efficiency in concentrated market, which 
is ascribed to numerous channels (such as managers shirking, the pursuit of 
objective different from profit maximization, strategies to gain market power, or 
simply incompetence). 
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The efficiency channel has been proposed by the Chicago School as an 
alternative to explain the link between concentration and profits. According to the 
efficient structure hypothesis, more efficient firms, being characterized by lower 
costs, are able to improve profits and gain market shares, thus increasing market 
concentration. Therefore, the causality link between competition and efficiency is 
reversed. When the efficiency gain is attributed to superior management capability, 
the framework is also known as the X-efficiency hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973). The 
alternative scale efficiency hypothesis, instead, postulates simply a production at a 
lower unit costs. 
The first empirical test of the two efficiency hypotheses, also combined with 
the SCP paradigm and the relative market power hypothesis, can be found in Berger 
(1995). The paper has found support for the X-efficiency hypothesis and the relative 
market power theory, even if limited, by using a combination of different cross 
sections for about 4,800 US banks over the 1980s.  A negative relationship between 
concentration and profitability has also been evidenced, hence rejecting the SCP 
framework.  
The efficiency channel has been recognized also in a study conducted on US 
state-level data between 1975 and 1992 by Jayaratne and Strahan (1998). Their 
outcome shows that, once constraints on bank expansion were removed, bank 
performance improved, as testified by the substantial reduction of operating costs 
and loan losses. The authors conclude that state-wide branching and interstate 
banking opening has allowed an advancement of the more efficient banks at the 
expenses of the inefficient rivals.  
Confirming the above results, Stiroh and Strahan (2003) have found that 
deregulation not only allowed the efficient banks to grow, but also let poorly 
performing banks narrow, and least efficient ones shrank the most. Both studies 
qualify branching restriction as a market distortion, that protected inefficient banks 
to the detriment of customers. In fact, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) notice that the 
reduction in banks’ costs was transmitted to borrowers through lower lending rates. 
while Stiroh and Strahan (2003) evidence a reallocation of assets to the better banks, 
that after the deregulation were controlling about 70% of the industry. 
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The relationship between market share and efficiency has inspired Boone 
(2008) to propose its own index, based on the hypothesis that performance improves 
with competition through the efficiency channel. From a cost-efficiency point of 
view, more efficient banks are better able in increasing their market share, therefore 
also their profits. Thus, if profitability is directly influenced by competition, when 
an efficient bank expands its market share and profitability, the greater the 
competition, the greater the expansion. Eventually, given an average level of 
efficiency, increasing the level of competitiveness involves, at the same time, a 
growth for efficient banks’ market share and a decline for inefficient ones. Hence, 
the suggested index captures the market share percentage variation due to a unit 
percentage change of the marginal cost. 
Employing the Boone index, van Leuvensteijn et al. (2010) explore the degree 
of competition in the lending market for five EU countries, the UK, the US and 
Japan. Over the period 1994-2004 they detect US to have the most competitive 
market. Germany and Spain show the highest degree of competitiveness within the 
European countries, while Italy is characterized by a decline of competition over 
time. A lower level of competition is found in UK, France and Japan markets. 
The idea that efficiency channel and market power channel might be 
modelled within a unique measure has come to Koetter et al. (2012). By questioning 
the implicit assumption of perfect efficiency behind the conventional Lerner index, 
they argue that all divergences between prices and marginal costs cannot be 
attributable to market power. Thus, they have proposed a modified Lerner index 
accounting for efficiency, or, more correctly, for inefficiency.  
To test the new Lerner, they have compared it with the conventional one by 
estimating them both on sample of yearly data from all U.S. insured banks between 
1976 and 2007. Their results show an efficiency-adjusted Lerner systematically 
higher than the conventional. Moreover, while detecting a same positive 
relationship between both measures and cost efficiency, only the adjusted Lerner 
has showed a negative relation with profit efficiency. Therefore, they conclude that 
the conventional Lerner lacks in explaining some facets of the market power, hence 
ascribed to efficiency. 
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1.3.2 Competition and the real economy 
As already pointed out, the ultimate effect of banking competition on the real 
economy is everything but easy to understand. On the first side, improvements in 
efficiency rates should ensure an enhancement in economic performance. On the 
other side, the effect of a change in the level of market power is much less clear. 
However, literature tends to support the existence of a positive relationship between 
banking market power and economic growth, albeit with few exceptions. 
By evaluating survey data covering 3,404 US small companies active in 1987, 
Petersen and Rajan (1994; 1995) have evidenced a higher credit availability for 
small young firms in concentrated markets. Since banking markets are 
characterized by information asymmetries, relationship lending may help in solving 
the issue, as long as banks can extract a rent from the long-term agreement. As 
competition reduces such rents, banks would be discouraged from investing in long-
lasting commitments. Hence, higher market power promotes young businesses’ 
growth. 
Similarly, Berger et al. (1998) evidence a positive effect on lending supply to 
small business due to consolidation, but only when the merging banks are small and 
medium size. Moreover, the negative consequences on lending supply following 
large banks mergers are partially offset by rivals and by the lending restructuration 
of the consolidating banks. Their results, obtained on data regarding more than 
6,000 U.S. bank M&As occurred between 1980 and 1996, support the importance 
of the relationship lending especially for informationally opaque borrowers, as 
young firms.  
A more direct impact is detected by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), who have 
observed a first-order negative effect of bank concentration on the overall growth 
for 41 countries and 36 manufacturing sectors between 1980 and 1990. The study 
only partially supports the literature that relates a lower credit supply to higher 
concentration, since they have evidenced a different involvement for sectors more 
relying on external finance. In these cases, a concentrated market facilitates credit 
access, especially for young business. Therefore, as younger firms are more likely 
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to produce innovations, the final result is an enhancement of growth. Besides, they 
have demonstrated once more the importance of relationship lending in connecting 
concentration and credit availability. 
A partially different result is obtained by Beck et al. (2004), who detect a 
more difficult access to credit in concentrated market, even more problematic for 
small firms, by exploring firm-level survey data for a cross-section of 74 countries. 
However, in countries with higher GDP per capita, better developed institutions and 
credit registry, the link appears not significant. On the other hand, public bank 
ownership and regulatory market constraints exacerbate the detrimental effect. 
Therefore, although they claim a support of the structure-conduct-performance and 
its hypothesis of negative effects of market power, this is true only for less 
developed countries. 
The possibility of a third way is presented by Carbo et al. (2003). By 
analysing regional economic growth for Spain between 1986 and 1998, their work 
has observed no significant effects due to changes in competition. This singular 
result can be explained by considering the preliminary findings of the study, which 
have evidenced an increase in concentration (measured by the HHI) but no relevant 
variation in the degree of competition over time. Therefore, their evidence is multi-
faceted. First, there is need of major changes in the level of competition in order to 
generate a relevant effect on the real economy. Second, a consolidation not 
necessarily leads to a change in competition. Thus, as a measure of concentration, 
the HHI is not a good proxy for competition. 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) have analysed the relationships between 
banking competition and credit supply for 16 countries by using the Rajan and 
Zingales’ (1998) methodology. The approach makes use of sectoral data, which are 
interacted with a competition index, i.e. the country’s H-statistics. In contrast with 
the mainstream literature, their results have detected a positive link between 
competition and growth, hence evidencing that market power might be harmful 
especially for financial dependent industries. Moreover, the level of concentration 
is not statistically significant in predicting the level of sector growth.  
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Coccorese (2008) has explored the link between banking concentration and 
economic growth for Italy between 1991 and 2001 from a distinct perspective: he 
has considered that also an inverse relation may be possible. In fact, the study 
evidences that, in the short-run, banking concentration has a negative effect on 
economic growth, while in the long-run is economic growth that reduces banks’ 
market shares. Therefore, the outcome is dual: first, a double side channel is 
possible; second, econometric models employed to disentangle the relationship 
need to be correct for potential reverse causality. 
Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2011) have detected a first-order positive 
effect of financial development on economic growth for 53 European industrial 
sectors over the period 1993-2003. Besides, they have pointed out that monopoly 
power affects economic growth in an inverted-U-shape way, that is the positive 
effect of market power on growth is highest at intermediate values.  
Lastly, Coccorese (2017) estimates two market power indices, namely the 
conventional Lerner index and a stochastic Lerner index (Coccorese, 2014) over a 
wide panel of 11,985 credit institutions operating in 113 countries on the period 
1993-2012.  Employing a generalised method of moments dynamic panel data 
approach in order to correct for potential reverse causality, he shows a positive and 
strong relation between market power and growth, hence supporting that economic 
development is stronger when banks can rely on some market power. 
1.3.3 Competition and the monetary policy transmission 
In the monetary policy transmission, banks are the connection point between 
the Central Bank and the real economy. Three are the channels: the interest rate, the 
credit channel, and the lending channel. To explain how the three channels work, 
let us assume, for instance, a tightening monetary policy. 
The traditional interest rate – or money – channel pertains the liability side of 
banks’ balance sheet. Open-market operations undertaken by the monetary 
authority during a monetary policy tighten involve a drop of banks’ reserves. 
Hence, since banks have to meet the reserve requirement, they must reduce 
reservable deposits encouraging household to shift into other alternatives. 
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Therefore, the interest rates on these substitutes must rise. When the short-term 
interest rates increase is transferred to longer-term interest rates, the aggregate 
demand diminishes. However, the money channel assumes that banks do not retain 
excess reserves. Since after the financial crisis banks began to expand their reserves, 
a growing emphasis has been placed on the alternative transmission channels. 
According to the broad credit channel, an increase in interest rates engenders 
a depreciation in firms’ net income and net worth, which in turn cause an increase 
in the external finance premium. As a result, the aggregate demand reduces. 
The third mechanism works on the assets side of the balance sheet, and is the 
one we are interested in. As already mentioned, a reduction in bank reserves 
following a tightening of monetary policy translates into a smaller number of 
reserved deposits. Therefore, banks have two alternatives: to replace deposits with 
other non-reservable liabilities; or, to reduce their assets. The second option, which 
induces a reduction of the aggregate loans supply, identifies the lending channel 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Peek and Rosengren, 2014). 
Since banking competition affects lending, it is likely that a change in the 
degree of market competitiveness involves monetary policy transmission and, 
according to Olivero et al. (2011a), it can happen in several ways.  
As long as larger banks can access more easily alternative sources of funding 
(Köhler, 2015), they are more able to counterbalance the reserves shrinkage due to 
a monetary policy tightening. Therefore, a change in competition due to an increase 
of larger banks’ market share may weaken the lending channel, involving a lower 
reduction of loans supply.  
In addition, as pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (1995), a concentrated 
market encourages banks to establish long-term relations with their borrowers, in 
order to extract quasi-rent from their informative advantage. As a result, borrowers, 
especially the opaque ones, are somehow linked to the bank: shifting would be 
expensive, and alternative sources of funding are not guaranteed. Thus, the 
reduction of the credit offer following a restrictive monetary policy will result in an 
excess demand of those who are no longer funded and, the higher the switching 
costs, the higher the reduction of the aggregate supply.  
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Finally, a tougher competition generates greater price sensitivity to marginal 
cost variations. Hence, a change in deposit rates due to a shock of reserves will be 
more directly transmitted to lending rates, meaning a stronger transmission channel. 
In considering the importance of the topic, there is a relative scarcity of 
literature evaluating the role of banking competition in the transmission of 
monetary policy, both theoretical and empiric. 
The importance of the banking market structure for monetary policy has been 
underscored in Aftalion and White (1977; 1978) and Vuchelen (1978). Some years 
later, VanHoose (1983; 1985) has indicated the degree of competition in the deposit 
market as an important determinant of the monetary policy actions results, also 
underlining that the federal funds rate is ineffective in competitive banking systems. 
More recently, Baglioni (2007) has demonstrated that the effectiveness of the 
lending channel depends substantially on the market structure, because of the 
differences in the strategic interactions between banks. In fact, where the 
interactions show strategical complementarity, such as under monopolistic 
competition, the aggregate outcome is amplified by the reaction of each individual 
bank. Conversely, when interactions are characterized by strategic substitutability, 
like in a Cournot oligopoly, the response of each bank is reduced by the reaction of 
the others.  
Empirical evidences mainly support a negative relationship between both 
competition and concentration and the effectiveness of monetary policy, even 
though with a few exceptions. 
Gunji et al. (2009) have shown that competition has reduced the effect of 
monetary shocks on loans supply in 22 countries over the period 1991-2001.  
Adams and Amel (2011) have found instead that an increase in market 
concentration reduced the sensitivity of bank lending to the US federal funds rate 
between 1996 and 2004. They conclude that market power lessens monetary policy 
effectiveness. However, their study is limited to the US banking market, and results 
are meaningful only in rural areas. Moreover, by employing the Herfindahl-
Hirshmann index they have rather assessed the impact of concentration on the 
lending channel. 
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In two different papers, Olivero et al. (2011a; 2011b) have explored the effect 
on monetary policy transmission through the bank lending channels of both 
concentration (measured by the CR5 and the HHI) and competition (assessed 
through the H-statistics) for 10 Latin American and 10 Asian countries over the 
period 1996-2006. They have evidenced that either banking competition and 
concentration reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission, especially 
for small, less capitalized banks with a lower liquidity. 
Amidu and Wolfe (2013) have detected the positive effect of market power, 
measured with the Lerner index, on the lending channel of a wide panel of 978 
banks from 55 different countries during 2000–2007.  
Finally, the results about five ASEAN countries between 1999 and 2014 by 
Khan et al. (2016) are quite mixed. While they find a coherent negative relationship 
between concentration and effectiveness of monetary policy for each employed 
proxy (i.e. CR5 and HHI), their results about market power are more confusing. In 
fact, although the regression with the Lerner index confirms the reducing effect of 
market power, the assessment with the Boone indicator leads to opposite results. 
However, their challenging results seems very interesting. As a matter of fact, the 
study evidences that the market power channel and the efficiency channel may 
involve two different outcomes regarding monetary policy transmission. 
1.4 Banking competition and stability: friends or enemies? 
The nature of the relationship between bank competition and financial 
stability is one of the longest discussed, both theoretically and empirically. The 
assessment of the actual competitive conditions of the market and the relative 
impact on stability is crucial for policy makers and regulators, since the effect of 
any policy may be extremely different depending on whether competition supports 
financial stability or not. For example, the issue is very relevant regarding mergers 
and acquisitions, two measures which are typically employed by regulators to avoid 
banks’ default. Since M&As increase market concentration, their suitability as 
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restructuring actions necessarily involves some evaluations about their impact on 
systemic stability.  
1.4.1 Theoretical literature 
Literature typically distinguishes between two theories: the “competition-
fragility” view and the “competition-stability” hypothesis. By stating that a more 
concentrated market is safer, the traditional “competition-fragility” theory deems 
competition detrimental for banking stability, since it erodes banks’ market power 
and profit margins. Conversely, the alternative “competition-stability” theory 
argues that competition (or lower concentration) may better improve the stability 
of the banking system. 
Belonging to the first field, the “charter (or franchise) value” theory (Marcus, 
1984; Keeley, 1990) states that higher market power is functional in maintaining a 
proper charter value, and competition, reducing them both, constitutes an incentive 
to engage in risk-taking activities. A bank’s franchise value can be interpreted as 
an opportunity cost in case of bankruptcy, thus the greater the value, the higher the 
cost. As shareholders want to protect their value, they will encourage managers to 
improve assets’ quality and hold more capital, hence diminishing the probability of 
default.  
Besides, a concentrated market is constituted by larger banks. Acting as 
monopolists, they protect the system against sudden shocks and assets deterioration 
through the buffer provided by their profits, eventually reducing the probability of 
systemic crises (Allen and Gale, 2004; Boyd et al., 2004). Moreover, big financial 
institutions are typically more able to exploit scale and scope economies and better 
diversify their portfolios, hence their individual risk is relatively low (Diamond, 
1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Williamson, 
1986). 
Less competitive markets also allow for more valuable relationships with 
borrowers. Indeed, long-term agreements grant higher quality information, which 
translates in a better liability and credit risk management (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; 
Smith, 1984). Conversely, since competition reduces banks’ informative 
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advantages, they are less incentivized in investing in borrowers’ screening, hence 
affecting their portfolio credit quality (Chan et al., 1986; Besanko and Thakor, 
1993; Boot and Greenbaum, 1993; Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004; Marquez, 2002).  
High competition may also become a vehicle of spreading contagion. The 
theoretical model by Allen and Gale (2000) shows that, when banks are price taker, 
which is the case of perfect competition, there is no incentive for safe banks in 
providing liquidity to distressed ones. Hence, their consequent default will put in 
danger the whole sector. They also consider that the lower is the number of the 
institutions operating in the market, the easier the monitoring by supervisors, 
therefore a higher level of resilience is ensured. Furthermore, banks acting in less 
than competitive markets can strategically agree to rescue troubled banks, while 
coordination problems arising in dispersed markets make the agreement less easy 
(Sáez and Shi, 2004). 
Lastly, Matutes and Vives (1996) notice that the market structure is relevant 
also regarding the final effects of protection policies, such as deposit insurance. In 
fact, if on the one side such policy measure reduces fragility by preventing bank 
runs, it also engenders moral hazard by providing incentives to banks to engage in 
riskier activities. Thus, in a more competitive environment, those incentives are 
exacerbated (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Matutes and Vives, 1996). 
On the other side of the coin, according to Boyd and De Nicoló (2005), market 
power allows bank to charge higher loan rates. Since in a market characterized by 
information asymmetries a borrower who optimally selects investments might 
decide to assume greater risks (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), consequently the amount 
of non-performing loans could increment, negatively affecting banks’ performance 
and risk of default. Therefore, there is a monotonic decreasing relationship between 
competition and risk seeking.  
From a slightly different point of view, a market consisting of few big 
systemically relevant banks may be dangerous (Mishkin, 1999, 2006; Barth et al., 
2012). According to the “too-big-to-fail” literature, regulators will be more likely 
to rescue troubled institutions, endangering moral hazard, and consequently risk-
taking behavior and financial fragility (Kane, 2010; Rosenblum, 2011). The 
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expression “too-big-to-fail” appeared for the very first time in 1984 when, in the 
occasion of Continental Illinois National Bank’s nationalization, the Wall Street 
Journal reported a list of 11 large banks that regulators would have never allowed 
to fail. Afterwards, the term has become popular during the subprime crisis, 
referring to those institutions whose default would endanger the whole system 
(Molyneux et al, 2014; Moenninghoff et al, 2015).   
Concentration can also involve stability through bank size in a different way. 
Since banks’ size is positively linked with complexity, large banks may be more 
difficult to monitor than small ones (Beck et al., 2006a, 2006b). Hence, an increase 
in size may involve a contraction in transparency. A bigger bank is more able to 
expand across multiple geographic markets and businesses, to use sophisticated 
(and sometimes opaque) financial instruments, and to build an extremely complex 
corporate organization. All the above may result into higher operational risk, lower 
managerial efficiency and corporate control, also reducing market self-regulation 
and regulatory action efficacy in hampering excessive risk-taking (Cetorelli et al., 
2007). 
Finally, lower competition may worsen adverse selection, as banks with 
market power may start predatory lending reducing their screening activities 
(Caminal and Matutes, 2002).  
Nevertheless, the two hypotheses “competition-fragility” and “competition-
stability” are not necessarily incompatible. Through a modification of the model by 
Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) that includes the hypothesis of imperfect correlation 
between loan defaults, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) find a U-shaped link 
between default risk and competition. According to their model, the decline in the 
lending rates due to increasing competition may be followed by two different 
effects: a risk-shifting effect, that is the reduction in default probability; and a 
margin effect, that is the reduction in the revenues from the loans. They show that 
in concentrated market the first effect prevails, then any new entrance in the market 
enhances stability. In fragmented markets, instead, the second effect is prominent, 
hence a new entry reduces the soundness of the system. 
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1.4.2 Empirical literature 
The ambiguous nature of the relationship between banking competition and 
stability has also been confirmed by an extensive empirical literature that has found 
mixed evidence.  
In line with the “competition-fragility” hypothesis, Keeley (1990) suggests 
that banks with higher market power tend to maintain more capital to protect their 
valuable charters, and this would result in a lower default risk. Conducted on a 
sample of quarterly data from 1970 through 1986 for 85 US large holding 
companies, the study has evidenced that banks with higher Tobin’s q also showed 
lower risk premiums on large CD’s. As a consequence, a number of the 
bankruptcies occurred during the ‘80s may be ascribed to deregulation and the 
following reduction of monopoly rents suffered by banks. 
Similarly, by evaluating a sample of more than 100 publicly traded US BHCs 
between 1986 and 1994, Demsetz et al. (1996) have evidenced that to higher 
franchise values (calculated as the difference between a firm’s market value and its 
replacement costs) corresponded both lower systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
In fact, banks with higher charter value were better capitalized and showed a lower 
asset risk. 
Salas and Saurina (2003) have reproduced Keeley’s model on 21 Spanish 
commercial banks over the period 1968-1998. They have found a positive 
relationship between Tobin’s q and the capital on asset ratio, while a negative link 
between the former and the loan loss ratio. Hence, they have concluded that to 
higher charter value corresponds a higher solvency and a lower credit risk. 
On the opposite side, a large literature also supports the “competition-
stability” theory.  
Boyd et al. (2006) have highlighted a positive relationship between 
competition and bank stability by using two different samples: a cross-section of 
2,500 US banks operating in June 2003; a panel data set of around 2700 commercial 
banks active in 134 countries between 1993 and 2004.  
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Confirming these results on a panel of individual banks data for 133 countries 
over the period 1993 to 2004, De Nicoló and Loukoianova (2007) have detected an 
even stronger relationship when taking into account bank ownership, and when 
state-owned banks have a considerable market share. 
Yeyati and Micco (2007) have observed that competition in eight Latin 
American countries over the period 1993-2002 was heavily affected by two 
contemporary phenomena: a rising consolidation, led by many important mergers, 
and a progressive entry of foreign players in the markets. They have noticed neither 
link between concentration (measured by HHI, CR3 and CR5) and competition 
(assessed through the Rosse-Panzar H-statistics), nor between concentration and 
insolvency risk (proxied by the Z-score), rather a negative relationship is 
highlighted between competition and insolvency risk. 
Schaeck and Čihák (2008) have demonstrated that efficiency is crucial in the 
transmission link between competition and stability. By using a GMM estimator on 
a sample of more than 3600 European banks and 8900 US banks between 1995 and 
2005, they have detected a negative relationship between the Boone indicator and 
the Z-score, even when controlling for concentration (as measured by the HHI), 
concluding that competition strengthens bank stability, through the efficiency 
channel. 
Assessing the dynamic link between competition and stability for a sample of 
2529 European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009, both in the short and 
long run, Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) have found that the Lerner index negatively 
“Granger-causes” the Z-score, hence concluding that competition increases 
stability. 
Also the hypothesis of a nonlinear relationship between competition and 
stability has its own empiric support. 
Berger et al. (2009) underline that, although market power may promote high 
credit risk concentration, banks can manage to protect their franchise value with 
capital injection or other techniques, achieving a reduced overall risk. In fact, 
exploring a sample of 8,235 banks from 23 industrial countries over 1999-2005, 
they have found that banks with higher market power (measured by the Lerner 
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index) had riskier loan portfolios, as indicated by higher non-performing loan ratios. 
However, their overall risk exposure was lower, as captured by their Z-scores. 
Moreover, as they have included squared measures for competition, they have 
detected nonlinearities, hence supporting the theoretical result by Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo (2010).   
A study by Jimenez et al. (2013) has explicitly tested the Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo’s hypothesis on 107 Spanish banks between 1988 and 2003. After 
controlling for bank specific and macroeconomic variables, they have detected a 
convex relationship between competition and risk in the loans market, while finding 
a concave relation in the deposit market. Also including squared measurements for 
competition, they confirm the non-linearity of the link. 
Fu et al. (2014) reach a similar conclusion for a cross-country dataset of 14 
countries from Asia Pacific between 2003 and 2010. Estimating the Z-score and the 
probability of default as defined by Bharath and Shumway (2008) at the bank level, 
they have discovered a risk that is decreasing in the market power (proxied by the 
Lerner index) while increasing in the level of concentration (as measured by the 
CR3). In other words, a lower pricing power fosters bank risk exposure, but higher 
concentration hinders financial stability. 
The empirical studies evaluated so far tend to assess the relationship between 
competition (or concentration) and financial stability focusing on a bank level 
perspective, mainly evaluating banks’ risk, as credit risk (Jayaratne and Strahan, 
1998; Berger et al., 2009; Jimenez et al., 2013), interest rate risk (Delis and 
Kouretas, 2011), or default risk (Repullo, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009; Berger et al., 
2009; Jiménez et al., 2013; Turk Ariss, 2010; Fiordelisi e Mare, 2014; Fu et al., 
2014). Others instead focus on a broader definition of stability, interpreted as 
absence of crises, or assessing systemic risk. 
Among the others, Beck et al (2006a) have used cross-country aggregate data 
on 69 Nations from 1980 to 1997. In line with the methodology developed by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a, 1998b), they have employed a dummy 
variable to classify if a systemic crisis took place. Their results show that a more 
concentrated banking system leads to less crises but, at the same time, competition 
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is not likely to increase instability. Therefore, both concentration and 
competitiveness influence positively the soundness of the system. 
Using the same methodology on a sample of 45 countries over the period 
1980-2005, Schaeck et al. (2009) have detected that competition, measured by the 
Panzar Rosse H-statistic, lowers systemic crises’ probability, also enhancing time 
to crisis. At the same time, banking concentration is found to be associated with 
higher distress probability and briefer time to crisis. 
By employing aggregate data for banks from the EU-25 between 1997 and 
2005, Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) assert that a higher national concentration has 
had a negative impact on European financial stability, as measured by the aggregate 
Z-score. Their results are not confirmed by Ijtsma et al. (2017) who detect no 
significant effect of concentration on stability on either bank-level or country-level 
Z-score. 
1.5 Conclusions 
Financial Institutions (FIs) are “special” intermediaries that play a pivotal role 
in the economy, since they promote development and are the transmission hub for 
monetary policy. However, offering a wide series of specific services, thus 
performing a series of distinctive functions, they end up incurring in a series of 
peculiar risks. Therefore, their contribution to the economy has to be carefully 
considered, since their default can involve terrible consequences. In this chapter we 
have tried to summarize the main literature about banking stability and competition, 
highlighting once more the growing importance of financial intermediaries for the 
economy.  
Regarding financial stability, the literature seems to agree about its 
importance. Since the Thirties of last century, the detrimental effects of instability 
on the economy have been well documented. Moreover, the latest episodes of 
turmoil have left an important inheritance, demonstrating that a lack of soundness 
may involve serious damages. For all these reasons, regulators are extremely 
concerned about the topic and encourage the development of new methods of 
1.5 Conclusions 
36 
calculating risk on which to rely on a political perspective. In fact, the very concept 
of stability is changing, evolving from a simple idea of each component soundness, 
to a more complex and inclusive definition that identifies the system in a more 
organic way. 
About competition, instead, evidences are more blurred, mainly due to the 
peculiarities of the financial system. On a first side, banks’ market power is being 
redeemed by modern studies, despite it has been long challenged by traditional 
literature, since considered as a vehicle for collusion. Indeed, a too competitive 
system seems to worsen both economic growth and monetary policy transmission.  
Besides, the relation between competition and stability itself is not completely 
understood, and a third option between the competition-fragility/competition-
stability hypothesis seems possible. Actually, the ultimate effect of the competition 
degree on the system soundness appears strictly related to the specific features of 
the particular industry. 
Concluding, many hints for new research can be deduced from our review. 
First of all, there is a large room, and demand, for new financial stability measures, 
since the usual ones have been too often found inadequate ex-post. The same goes 
for competition appraisal, especially after the literature has shown the inconsistency 
of some traditional indicators. Moreover, a lot can be done in trying to combine the 
two aspects we evidenced concerning competition, namely market power and 
efficiency. 
  





Looking for stability: Drawing Merton’s distance 
to default on a book-value framework 
2.1 Introduction 
How to measure banking sector stability is a long-debated topic, especially in 
light of the recent financial turmoil. Many approaches and indicators have been 
developed, ranging from generic definitions of banking crises (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998a, 1998b) to accounting-based measurements (e.g. Boyd and 
Graham, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988) and complex market-based models 
(Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974). However, there is no widespread 
consensus on any method, either from academic literature or from regulators. 
In addition, country-specific market peculiarities also make a difference. For 
example, in the Italian banking system there is a large heterogeneity between 
intermediaries, of which many are cooperative banks (BCCs), i.e. local small non-
listed credit institutions. Their activity is founded on the principle of mutuality, 
focuses mainly on members, and represents a valuable support to local economic 
development: hence, BCCs do not act as profit-maximizing entities. It follows that 
market-based stability measurements are not adequate for the Italian banking sector. 
Moreover, even the use of the Z-score – the most conventional accounting-based 
measure – seems not fully appropriate, as it is based on a profitability index. 
This paper proposes a new index for banks’ insolvency risk, derived from the 
“Contingent Claim Analysis” by Merton (1974) and Black and Scholes (1973). This 
indicator – which we term ‘book-value distance to default’ (BVDD) – is a 
modification of the classic distance to default, but entirely constructed on book-




2016), thus overlooking market data. Furthermore, being based on the asset/liability 
structure, it is suitable also for those companies that do not have profit 
maximization as their main goal.  
We test our stability measure on a sample of Italian banks over the period 
1996-2013, working on unconsolidated balance sheet data published by ABI (the 
Italian Banking Association). We employ two econometric approaches: a logit 
model, and a semiparametric Cox model (Cox, 1972). We find strong empirical 
evidence that the BVDD is a reliable measure of bank stability, also when 
controlling for bank-specific, market, and macroeconomic variables.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly 
reviews our main reference literature. Section 2.3 develops the theoretical 
background and the methodology employed to construct the BVDD index. Section 
2.4 describes the empirical approach for testing the reliability of BVDD as an 
insolvency risk measure, whose results are presented and discussed in Section 2.5. 
Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 From the Merton model to the book-value distance to default: 
a literature review  
The literature makes a wide use of insolvency risk measures developed on the 
ground of the Contingent Claim Analysis, both at the bank level (e.g. Vassalou and 
Xing, 2004; Gropp et al., 2006; Akhigbe et al., 2007; Duffie et al., 2007; Campbell 
et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2015) and at the country level (Anginer et al., 2014). 
Moreover, the CCA framework has also been employed to develop empirical credit 
measures, such as the EDF by Moody’s (Bohn and Crosbie, 2003). 
Proposed by Merton (1974), the CCA defines the event of default as a state 
in which a bank is not able to “satisfy some or all of the indenture requirements”. 
Subsequently, constructing a system of two non-linear simultaneous equations, the 
Merton model derives key variables from market data in order to estimate two risk 
indexes, namely the distance to default and the risk neutral default probability.  




The charm of the methodology stays in its ability to combine market values 
with balance sheet items, thus providing a sound theoretical structure for 
investigating firms’ default, which is neither time-dependent nor sample-
dependent. Yet, criticisms have been also raised. The main objection is that the 
model, being structural, requires strong assumptions: for example, stock returns are 
normally distributed, there is just one single homogenous class of debt (thus failing 
to capture differences among heterogeneous debts), debt is static and unchanged 
through the years (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Saunders and Allen, 2002, pp. 58-
61).  
As a matter of fact, the technique presents two peculiar drawbacks: first, 
results are affected by the empirical methodology employed to estimate the system 
of equations; second, the model itself can be applied only to publicly traded firms’ 
data, which often makes impossible to analyse large portions of many markets. 
Moreover, the approach has shown to be rather difficult to implement (Kealhofer, 
2003; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Chan-Lau and Sy, 2007; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; 
Guerra et al., 2016).  
In order to overcome such shortcomings, part of the literature has tried to 
suggest improvements and simplifications.  
A noteworthy contribution has been conducted by Vasicek (1984), who 
proposed to slightly change the focus of the analysis on the company itself rather 
than its debt. A real business is more complicated than the firm described by 
Merton: a company has a number of different classes of equity and liabilities; the 
debt evolves over time; and, above all, a default may happen also in cases where 
the value of the debt is lower than the assets value. Thus, main hypothesis of the 
model is the differentiation between default events and actual bankruptcy. A default 
event occurs every time the assets’ value of a company becomes lower than a 
‘distress barrier’ that takes into account a given level of liabilities. In other terms, 
combining debts’ maturities, they allow the event of default to happen also in cases 
where the assets value exceeds the whole liability value.  
The Vasicek model is nowadays better known as KMV model, since it has 
been developed afterwards within the KMV corporation. The latter is a company 
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founded by Kealhofer, McQuown, and Vasicek in 1989 and acquired by Moody’s 
in 2002. The output measure obtained with the Moody’s KMV model is the 
Expected Default Frequency – or EDF – which represents the one-year default 
probability for any individual firm (Crouhy et al., 2000; Kealhofer, 2003).  
From another perspective, Bharath and Shumway (2008) have proposed a 
simplified version of the classic distance to default, and they call it ‘naïve distance 
to default’ (DD). One peculiarity of the naïve DD is that it does not require solving 
the equation simultaneously, even if it retains the overall structure of the KMV-
Merton model. By comparing their index with the Merton’s distance to default, they 
conclude that the latter is not a sufficient statistic to proxy for probability of 
bankruptcy, while its functional form is suitable for implementing simpler and 
better performing methods. 
Albeit remarkably improving the original structure, both the Moody’s KMV 
EDF and the naïve DD use market volatility, therefore they can be calculated only 
for listed or publicly traded corporations. A strand of the literature has been recently 
developed within the CCA with the objective of modelling new default indicators 
making use of book-value data only. Although not very extensive, its results and 
evidence seem encouraging.  
One of the first applications of this approach can be found in a contribution 
by Souto (2008), who aims at assessing the vulnerabilities of the Uruguayan 
banking sector after the 2002 crisis. Because of the absolute lack of market data, 
and in order to nonetheless incorporate volatility in his analysis, he proposes a 
variant of the Merton model entirely based on book-value data, showing that the 
methodology is able to capture the credit risk escalation during the banking crisis 
period, not only for the financial sector, but also for the corporate sector. Basically, 
he suggests replacing the implied value of assets with the value of assets from 
balance sheets (or an estimate of it) and the volatility of assets with the volatility of 
the book-value assets variation. 
This methodology has been then applied by Blavy and Souto (2009), who 
employ quarterly balance sheet data over the period 1997-2008 for 207 Mexican 
banks. Investigating macro-financial interconnections in the Mexican banking 




sector, they find that both domestic and foreign macro-financial variables are 
related to banking stability. However, even though the results differ among banks, 
their book-value risk neutral default probability is found to be a good predictor for 
the non-performing loans to total loans ratio.  
Similarly, Souto et al. (2009) apply the methodology on a sample of 39 
Brazilian banks between 2001 and 2007, detecting deterioration in the estimated 
credit risk indicators following the early 2000s crisis.  
Later, Guerra et al. (2016) employ the book-value of assets and its volatility 
through the adaptation of the Merton model to estimate the distance to default and 
the probability of default for a group of 65 Brazilian banks on the period 2002-
2012. They construct their indicators for both individual banks and the whole group 
of banks in the system, finding their proposed measure able to foresee banking 
system distresses, like the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Our study provides some key contribution to this literature. Particularly, we 
propose a new stability indicator – the book-value distance to default (BVDD) – 
based on the classic distance to default derived within the Contingent Claim 
Analysis but entirely constructed on book-value data, and we test its accuracy as an 
insolvency risk measure. To achieve our aim, we employ two methodologies widely 
used in the empirical literature (Gropp et al., 2006; Duffie et al., 2007; Bharath and 
Shumway, 2008; Chiaramonte et al., 2016): a standard logit model and a 
semiparametric Cox model. Both demonstrate that the book-value distance to 
default is a good predictor for banks’ default. Furthermore, as we perform our 
analysis on a sample of 863 Italian banks over the period 1996-2013, we provide 
some insights about the Italian banking sector during a period characterized by 
substantial structural transformations. 
2.3 The book-value distance to default 
Creating the Contingent Claim Analysis, Merton (1974) proposed to apply a 
framework borrowed from the theory of options to the corporate risk analysis.
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According to the Option Pricing Theory, a European7 option is a financial 
derivative that grants to the holder the right to buy (in this case, the option is said 
‘call’) or to sell (hence it is said ‘put’) a certain underlying (goods or financial 
assets) at a particular price, which is called strike price, at a predetermined maturity.  
Recalling briefly the case of a call option, at a time t the holder obtains the 
right to buy a certain underlying at a future time T (with T>t) at a given strike price 
(S). It appears likely that the holder, as a rational agent, will exercise his right only 
if at time T the strike price is lower than the current price of the underlying (UT). In 
this case, he would obtain a gain equal to UT–S, and the option be said “in the 
money”. 
Let us consider now a bank’s liability as a single debt which requires a 
payment at a certain maturity (T). In line with the Merton’s hypothesis, the bank 
will meet its obligation only if, at time T, its total assets value (VT) exceeds the value 
of the debt (L); otherwise it will default. In other terms, if at time T the difference 
between assets value and debt is positive, the bank survives; the difference VT –L 
represents bank’s equity (E), and a bank is considered healthy if it is positive.  
Employing the option pricing concept above described, Merton conjectured 
to consider banks’ equity8 as the pay-off of a theoretical call option. In fact, as a 
European call option’s pay-off is positive only if UT>S, similarly banks’ equity is 
positive only if VT >L.  
A further idea was to model the equity value through a modification of the 
Black and Scholes formula:  
 ( ) ( )21 dNLedNVE
Tr
tt
t−−=  (2.1) 
according to which the value of the equity (E) at a time t, contingent on the payment 
of a debt equal to L at a maturity T, is given by the difference between two factors: 
the expected value of the assets (V) and the value of the debt (L) at time T. Both 
factors are contingent on the option finishing in the money (i.e. V–L>0 at time T), 
risk-adjusted, and, as they are evaluated at time t, discounted at the riskless rate rt. 
                                                             
7 A European option differs from an American option, as the former can be exercised only at 
maturity, while the latter can be exercised at any time up to the maturity. 
8 Merton refers generally to firms.  




Since E represents a stochastic event, N(d1) and N(d2) account for uncertainty, 
ensuring that at time T “the option will be in the money”.9  
Focusing on N(d2), it expresses the probability that the bank will be able to 
meet its obligations at time T; hence, the higher its value, the higher the probability 
of survival for the bank. Therefore, according to Merton (1974), d2 can be 
interpreted as the distance from the event of default, and, for a general bank i at 
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where Vit is the value of assets, Lit is the face value of the debt (i.e. total liability), rt 
is the risk-free rate and 
V
it
 is the assets’ volatility. T represents the time to maturity, 
i.e. the time at which the bank is required to meet the obligation (Black and Scholes, 
1973; Merton, 1974; Jones et al., 1984; Nielsen, 1992; Afik et al., 2016).  
In order to apply the framework to a dataset that mostly comprises non-listed 
banks, our methodology follows Souto (2008), Blavy and Souto (2009), and Guerra 
et al. (2016), who replace the implied asset value Vit with the book-value of assets 
for the bank i at time t, AVit . 
Furthermore, the theoretical model defines the event of default as a state in 
which the assets value is lower than the value of the whole liability, considered as 
a homogeneous class of debt with maturity T. Since this is quite unlikely to occur, 
also considering that banks’ liability is typically constituted by different debt 
categories with different maturity, we adopt the so-called “distress barrier” 
(Kealhofer, 2003; Guerra et al., 2016). Considering the debt structure of a bank as 
a portfolio of both long-term liabilities – with a time of maturity longer than T – 
and short-term (or current) debt – with a time of maturity shorter than or equal to T 
–, we compute the distress barrier (DBit) as a linear function of the book values of 
short-term (STDit) and long-term liabilities (LTDit): 
                                                             
9 A more exhaustive explanation of the model, with a precise derivation of d1 and d2, can be found 
in Nielsen (1992).  
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In line with Guerra et al. (2016), the value αit is set applying a rule identified 
by Bohn and Crosbie (2003) when determining the EDF, an empirical credit 
measure relying on the Merton model developed by Moody’s (Bohn and Crosbie, 




















 −  

 (2.4) 
To approximate the assets volatility, we follow Gambacorta and Song Shin 
(2016), who use “the standard deviation of the annual percentage change in the 
book-value of total assets over a three-year window”. Besides, as we are gauging a 
credit risk measure, we are more concerned about downward peaks of the assets 
value, whose reductions are more alarming than increases of the same amount. 
Nonetheless, part of the literature states that also a growth in the assets might 
engender risk (see for instance Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Altunbaş et al., 
2011).  
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In other terms, this is a ‘semi-downward’ volatility, which considers the entire 
value of an assets’ contraction but only a portion of its increases. In Eq. (2.6) we 
set θ = 0.1, meaning that an increase of the value of assets could also imply some 
risk, even if far smaller compared to a decrease. Of course, we acknowledge that 
our choice of the value of θ can be regarded as subjective, however other (low) 
values of such parameter do not notably affect the results. 
Finally, as we compute the one-year book-value distance to default, T = 1, 
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2.4 Empirical methodology, variables and data 
2.4.1 Econometric framework  
In order to test the validity of the book-value distance to default, built as 
defined in Section 2.3, we estimate the following model: 
 
0 1it it k r t iFAILED RISK     = + + + + +kitX  (2.9) 
Here, FAILEDit is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the bank i 
defaults at time t+1, and 0 otherwise, and RISKit is our variable of interest, i.e. the 
book-value distance to default (BVDDit) as defined in Eq. (2.8). Xkit is a vector of k 
bank-specific, market and macroeconomic control variables (later specified). We 
also include regional and time (year) fixed effects, γr and φt, to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
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The above model is estimated by employing two methodologies: a logistic 
(logit) model (Gropp et al., 2006), and a semiparametric Cox proportional hazard 
model (Cox, 1972; Gropp et al., 2006; Evrensel, 2008).  



























where Λ(*) is the cumulative logistic distribution, and Zjit is the vector of all the 
variables that are included in the model (i.e. risk, bank-specific, market, and 
macroeconomic variables).  
The logistic specification allows us to evaluate the impact of an increase of 
our variable of interest on the probability of default. Since BVDD measures the 
distance from the situation of default, we expect a decrease in the likelihood of 
failure correspondent to a BVDD’s growth. 
The second methodology we employ is a semiparametric Cox proportional 
hazard model with the following general form: 10 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0exp jt t  =jit jitZ Z  (2.11) 
Here λ(*) is the proportional hazard function, λ0(t) is the baseline hazard 
(which corresponds to the overall hazard when there is no influence of the 
regressors on the hazard rate), and Zjit is the general vector of the regressors as 
defined above. 
With the survival analysis we aim at evaluating the effect of a unit increase 
in BVDD for bank i at time t on its hazard rate, where the hazard rate λ(t) for bank 
i at year t is defined as the instantaneous risk of the bank’s disappearance in year t 
conditional on its existence up to time t. We expect that, being a proxy for banks’ 
financial stability, an increase in BVDD reduces the hazard rate. 
                                                             
10 A more detailed analysis of the model can be found in Appendix 2.2. 




Given the relationship between the probability of surviving after a certain 
time and the amount of risk that the bank has accumulated up to that time, the hazard 
rate measures the degree at which that risk is accumulated.  
The relationship between the hazard rate and the risk identifies the hazard 
function, and its shape is determined by the underlying process that determines the 
risk. While the risk can vary from the absence of any risk to the certainty of the 
failure event, the hazard rate can vary from zero to infinity, so that, when there is 
absence of risk, the correspondent hazard is zero, and when the risk grows 
(decreases) with time, the hazard rate grows (decreases). As we do not have any 
information about the shape of the hazard rate, we have opted for employing the 
Cox methodology, which provides estimates of the  vector avoiding assumptions 
about the functional form of the hazard over time. The only assumption needed is 
the ‘proportionality hypothesis’, i.e. that the hazard function is the same for all 
banks (Cox, 1972; Pappas et al., 2017). 
The Cox model also controls for censoring, which is an unavoidable 
occurrence when employing the survival analysis. In fact, a basic hypothesis behind 
any hazard model is that default is a necessary circumstance. Therefore, for each 
bank only two outcomes are observable: the failure, or the censoring (precisely, 
right censoring). As a standard approach, the model assumes censoring not to be 
informative about latent future failures that might occur in a period subsequent the 
window of analysis (e.g. Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Gropp et al., 2006; Campbell 
et al., 2008).  
To assess whether our model correctly identifies the events of default, we 
conduct a further test, estimating Type I and Type II errors in line with Gropp et al. 
(2006) and Chiaramonte et al. (2016). Type I error identifies missed failures, 
occurring when the model is not able to predict a failure that actually happened. It 
is calculated as the ratio of false negative events to the sum of false negative and 
true positive events. A Type II error, i.e. a false alarm, arises when a bank is 
indicated as failed by the model even if healthy in reality. It is given by the ratio of 
false positive events to the sum of false positive and true negative events.  
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To define whether a bank is forecasted by the survival analysis as defaulted, 
we need a cut-off point on the distribution of the predicted values: banks above the 
threshold are considered as defaulted, while all banks below it are treated as 
survived. It is evident that the position of the cut-off point has an impact on both 
Type I and Type II errors: lowering the threshold decreases the probability of 
defining a failed bank as healthy, then Type I error; at the same time, the probability 
of identifying a healthy bank as failed increases, therefore Type II error is higher. 
Consequently, the optimal definition of the cut-off point depends on the subjective 
weights assigned to the two types of errors (Poghosyan and Čihák, 2011; 
Chiaramonte et al., 2016). To minimize subjectivity, we have conducted the 
analysis twice, using the 10th and the 20th quantiles as cut-off, respectively. 
2.4.2 Dependent variable 
Defining the event of extinction might be not so straightforward, as a bank 
can exit from the market for various reasons. It can be put in compulsory liquidation 
by regulators, or closing can be voluntary. Moreover, also mergers and acquisitions 
between institutions tangle the picture, as they involve the cancellation of at least 
one of the merging intermediaries. In other terms, a bank can quit its activity not 
only because of a failure or a problematic situation, but also as a strategic choice.  
Therefore, in defining a bank as extinct, we follow Maggiolini and Mistrulli 
(2005): a bank that exited from the market is considered as extinct when either it 
has been subjected to compulsory liquidation, or it made losses during the last three 
years before its cancellation from the Bank of Italy’s registry. In all other cases, the 
observation is considered as censored. This procedure represents a standard 
approach in the empirical literature (e.g. Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Gropp et al., 
2006; Campbell et al., 2008).  
Moreover, to preserve the reliability of our analysis, we choose to follow an 
even more conservative approach: we consider as extinct a bank only when its data 
are available in the year before its extinction, while in the remaining cases the 
observation is assumed as censored.  




To sum up, our dependent variable FAILEDit is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the bank is considered as extinct after distress – as above described – 
and 0 otherwise (i.e. for non-failed banks and censored banks). 
2.4.3 Independent variables  
In our analysis, the variable of interest is BVDD (as defined in Section 2.3). 
Since it represents a stability measure (as it quantifies the distance of a bank from 
its default state), we expect lower BVDD’s for more troubled banks. Hence, as 
already noted, in the logit specification we expect a significant and negative 
coefficient for BVDD, meaning that an increase in the likelihood of default has 
occurred in the years preceding the event of failure. Similarly, in the hazard model 
framework we expect a coefficient that decreases the hazard ratio. 
For sake of comparison, we also employ another index of banking stability, 
namely the Z-score (ZSCORE). Since it is a generally recognized measure of banks’ 
distance from insolvency, comparing the estimated coefficients for the two indices 
should allow us to better assess the predictive power of our BVDD. 
The Z-score is computed as:  













where, μ(ROA) and μ(EQASS) are moving averages on a three-year window for the 
return on assets ratio (ROA) and the equity on assets ratio (EQASS), respectively, 
while σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA on the same three-year window 
(Coccorese and Ferri, 2017).  
Because both BVDD and ZSCORE are highly skewed, we use their natural 
logarithm (Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
Further, a third proxy of stability is here considered, i.e. the non-performing 
loans to total loans ratio (NPL), commonly employed as an accounting measure of 
bank credit risk. 
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To better capture differences in banks’ likelihood of default, we add a series 
of control variables, as identified by a wide literature (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989; 
Gropp, 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Altunbaş et al., 2011; 
Poghosyan and Čihák, 2011; Chiaramonte et al., 2015). 
Banks’ capital structure is assessed through the equity to total asset ratio 
(EQASS), while, in order to take into account the assets structure, we consider two 
variables: the logarithm of total assets (lnTOTASS), a proxy for banks’ size, and the 
loans to total assets ratio (LOANASS), a proxy for the level of involvement in 
traditional banking activities. The ratio of non-interest income to total income (NII) 
is included to capture business diversification.  
To account for bank profitability, we employ the net interest margin (NIM), a 
variable which focuses on traditional borrowing and lending activities. The NIM is 
typically employed in the stability literature (e.g. Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; Fu 
et al., 2014; IJtsma et al., 2017) as an alternative to the most common ROA, 
especially in models employing the ZSCORE, of which is a component. Moreover, 
as already underlined in Section 2.4.2, our dependent variable defines as ‘extinct 
after distress’ a bank that has suffered losses in the last three years before its exit 
from the market. Therefore, an estimate that uses either the ROA or the ROE might 
arise endogeneity issues. 
To capture the role of market concentration, we employ the regional 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). For multi-region banks it has been computed 
using banks’ branches as weights (Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2013). We control for 
macroeconomic factors by means of the logarithm of regional GDP per capita 
(GDP_PC) and regional GDP growth (GDP_GR), which help to catch the impact 
of local economic activity. In case of multi-region banks, both variables are again 
weighted by banks’ branches.  
We finally add a set of dummy variables corresponding to the different type 
of banks: Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCC), Banche di Credito Popolare 
(BCP), Commercial Banks (COMM), and Saving Banks (SAV).  
 




2.4.4 Data and summary statistics  
Our initial sample is made up of 1,174 Italian banks over the period 1993-
2013. Unconsolidated balance sheet data come from ABI (the Italian Banking 
Association). Regional Gross Domestic Product and deflator are available from 
Istat (Italian Statistical Institute). As a proxy for the risk-free rates we employ the 
interest rates on 1-year government bonds (source: Bank of Italy). 
To focus on institutions that are engaged in the credit intermediation activity, 
we retain banks with a loans to assets ratio comprised between 20% and 95%. In 
addition, we drop observations for which NII is lower than 1% or higher than 90% 
and EQASS is under 1% or over 75%.  
Further, since the calculation of BVDD (particularly, assets volatility) 
requires rolling windows of at least three consecutive values, banks for which less 
than four observations were available have been discarded.  
After this data selection process, our final sample is an unbalanced panel 
comprising 9,421 observations for 863 Italian banks over the period 1996 to 2013. 
Table 2.1 shows the yearly sample distribution of failed and survived banks. 
Over the period under scrutiny, 83 banks have been designated as failed. It is worth 
to notice that the largest part of troubled institutions has been acquired or merged, 
with only 2 banks subjected to compulsory liquidation before their cancellation 
from the Bank of Italy’s register. 
< INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE > 
Table 2.2 reports yearly descriptive statistics for our estimated BVDD’s, while 
Table 2.3 displays summary statistics for the various control variables. 
< INSERT TABLES 2.2 AND 2.3 ABOUT HERE > 
In Table 2.4, we provide means and standard deviations for the regressors 
disentangling between survived and failed banks.  
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To check whether the difference between the average values for the two 
groups is statistically significant, we perform a t-test for each variable. The results 
show that, on average, healthy banks’ BVDD is higher at the 1% level of 
significance. As expected, healthy banks show also greater values of ZSCORE than 
closed banks (the difference is significant again at the 1% level) and seem to be 
better capitalized and more profitable. Conversely, the level of credit risk (NPL) is 
higher for failed banks, which are characterized by larger loans to assets ratios (of 
about 5%) and non-interest income. They also face a more concentrated market 
with lower levels of GDP per capita than survived banks.  
Table 2.5 exhibits the correlations among variables. 
< INSERT TABLES 2.4 AND 2.5 ABOUT HERE > 
2.5 Results 
The estimation results for the logit model are displayed in Table 2.6. Column 
(1) refers to the model with BVDD as stability measure and without control 
variables. The estimated coefficient of BVDD is negative and significant, meaning 
that – as expected – the higher the banks’ stability, the lower their probability of 
failure. More precisely, as βlnBVDD = -0.8263, the correspondent odds ratio is e
-0.8263 
= 0.4377, meaning that for every unit increase of lnBVDD the odds of failure 
increase by a factor of 0.4377. Within our framework, the odds of failure are defined 
as the ratio of the probability of the event of failure and the probability that this 
event does not occur. If the estimated coefficient of a variable is negative, it means 
that the odds variation is less than one, i.e. that the probability that the bank survives 
(the denominator) increases more than the probability that it disappears (the 
numerator). Hence, going back to the estimated values, if two banks are similar in 
all characteristics but differ on their values of lnBVDD by one unit, then the bank 
with the higher value of ln BVDD has less than one half (more precisely, 0.4377) 
the odds of failure within one year as the bank with the lower ln BVDD value. The 
sign and significance of our stability indicator are robust when controlling for bank 




specific variables (column (2)), and market and macroeconomic variables with 
further bank specific dummies (column (3)).  
In columns (4) and (5) we replace lnBVDD with the other alternative stability 
proxies. Particularly, in column (4) we employ lnZSCORE, while in column (5) we 
use NPL. As expected, the coefficient of lnZSCORE is negative while the 
coefficient of NPL is positive (both significant at a 1% level), meaning that the 
probability of default is lower when stability (as measured by the Z-score) is higher 
and credit risk (as measured by the non-performing loans) is lower. Finally, to test 
whether BVDD has some additional prediction power besides ZSCORE and NPL, 
in column (6) we use it together with lnZSCORE, and in column (7) together with 
NPL.11 Since in both regressions the above covariates are all highly significant, we 
conclude that BVDD owns further explanatory power for banks’ default probability.  
Moving to the analysis of the control variables, some interesting insights can 
be inferred. Consistently with Köhler (2015), EQASS and lnTOTASS are important 
determinants of banks’ default probability for our sample. In detail, the coefficient 
of lnTOTASS is always negative and significant at the 1% level, meaning that larger 
banks are less likely to fail, essentially because they can obtain better portfolio 
diversification, greater level of scale and scope efficiency, hence a higher level of 
internal soundness (Lonzano-Vivas et al, 2011; Molyneux et al., 2014). Similarly, 
the negative (often significant) sign of the estimated coefficient for EQASS 
indicates higher resilience for better capitalized banks. According to the theory of 
financial intermediation, capital reserves provide a buffer again losses. Moreover, 
by representing the shareholders’ investment, a higher capitalization reduces 
incentives in risk-taking activities (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). For similar 
reasons, higher equity may involve a better screening activity on borrowers’ 
characteristics, hence leading to a lower level of risk and to an improved stability 
(Coval and Thakor, 2005). Our results are consistent also with Fiordelisi and Mare 
(2013), who evidence that assets size and capital adequacy have been negatively 
related to bank probability of default of Italian cooperative banks between 1997 and 
                                                             
11 A similar methodology has been employed by Bharat and Shumway (2008). 
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2009. We can notice that EQASS is always statistically significant at the 1% level, 
except in models that incorporate the ZSCORE variable; this might be due to the 
fact that the former is a component of the latter.  
< INSERT TABLE 2.6 ABOUT HERE > 
We now turn to the time-to-failure hazard estimations, whose empirical 
evidence is reported in Table 2.7. Column (11) shows the results for the model 
including only BVDD, column (12) adds bank specific controls only, column (13) 
includes all control variables and the bank specific dummies. Besides, column (14) 
incorporates ZSCORE as alternative stability indicator and column (15) delivers the 
results for the model with NPL as a risk indicator. Finally, columns (16) and (17) 
present estimates for two models combining BVDD with ZSCORE and NPL, 
respectively.  
Overall, the Cox semiparametric model tends to confirm the result of the 
logistic specification. The proportionality hypothesis is met across all model’s 
specifications at a 1% level (see bottom of Table 2.7). 
The coefficients of BVDD are significant for all models, and their negative 
sign confirms the expected impact on the hazard rate. Results appear robust across 
the various specifications. More in detail, considering the model in column (11), 
the estimated coefficient for BVDD is βlnBVDD = -0.7664. Therefore, as e
-0.7664 = 
0.4646, a unit increase of lnBVDD implies a decrease of the hazard of 53.54% (1-
0.4646) (Cleves et al., 2010, p. 131). The coefficient remains negative and 
significant at the 1% level also when inserting bank specific, market and 
macroeconomic control variables (column (12) and (13)).  
ZSCORE and NPL show the expected opposite relation with the hazard ratio. 
In fact, while an increase in ZSCORE implies a decrease in the likelihood of default 
(column (14)), NPL is positively correlated with the hazard (column (15)).  
Column (16) and (17) confirm the relevance of BVDD in predicting banks’ 
distresses, since its coefficient remains highly statistically significant even when 




controlling for ZSCORE and NPL, respectively. Therefore, we can conclude that 
BVDD is a robust predictor for banks’ failure probability.  
Regarding the control variables, larger banks and those with an adequate level 
of capital result less likely to fail, as well as more profitable institutions. The 
coefficients of the remaining market and macroeconomic control variables are not 
significant, which demonstrates that the banks’ business model as well as the ability 
of managers matter more than macroeconomic or market factors. 
< INSERT TABLE 2.7 ABOUT HERE > 
In Table 2.8, estimates for Type I and Type II errors, as defined in Section 
2.4.1, are reported. Focusing on the 10th quantile cut-off, for the Cox specification 
that considers only BVDD as the stability variable – i.e. column (11) – Type I error 
occurs with a frequency of 37.34%, while Type II error with a frequency of 9.53%. 
This means that BVDD is not able to identify a failed bank about 37 over 100 times, 
while it marks a sound bank as risky only in 9.5 over 100 times.  
Considering the model including BVDD and all bank specific, market and 
macroeconomic variables – i.e. column (13) – Type I error reduces to 24.09%. 
Hence, the full model with BVDD outperforms the similar definition considering 
the NPL ratio as the risk index (in this case Type I error is 28.91%).  
Once again the predicting power of the BVDD is confirmed also in column 
(16) and (17). In fact, by comparing column (16) with column (14), we can see a 
Type I error reduced by 7% (15.66% against 16.87%). Therefore, a model that 
combines BVDD and ZSCORE is more likely to identify a troubled bank than a 
model that includes only the latter. Likewise, adding the BVDD to a full model that 
already incorporates NPL reduces Type I error by more than 29% (20.48% versus 
the previous 28.91%), as can be seen by comparing columns (17) and (15). 
All model comprising ZSCORE seem to perform better in terms of both Type 
I and Type II errors, as evidenced in columns (14) and (16). Yet, a remark is 
important here. From Section 2.4.2, we have chosen to mark a bank as troubled also 
when it has recorded a loss during the last three years before its cancellation from 
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the Bank of Italy’s registry. Since ZSCORE is computed by using the return on 
assets ratio, the outperformance may result by construction. After all, a similar 
behaviour has been also noted for the other component of the Z-score, i.e. the equity 
on assets ratio.  
A further experiment has been conducted employing the 20th quantile as cut-
off. It is evident from Table 2.8 that setting a higher threshold has a negative impact 
on Type I error (which has reduced to 39% from 24.5%), while it enhances Type II 
error (now about 4.5% against the previous 9.4%). However, results confirm 
BVDD’s predictor power. 
< INSERT TABLE 2.8 ABOUT HERE > 
2.6 Conclusions 
Measuring the stability of the banking sector is a hot topic that concerns both 
politicians and academics, especially after the recent financial crises. The 
methodological proposals are numerous and assorted. This is because the 
appropriate indicator changes according to a number of factors, including the 
adopted definition of risk and the features of the specific market. Thus, 
acknowledging an unambiguous index is fairly problematic. 
In this chapter we have proposed an alternative measure of banks’ solvency 
risk – the book-value distance to default (BVDD) – which is a modification of the 
Merton’s distance to default entirely constructed on balance sheet data. Briefly, we 
have replaced the value of assets from balance sheet to the implied value derived 
from market data. Moreover, we have proxied assets volatility through a particular 
‘semi-downward’ volatility, which considers the whole value of the assets’ 
contractions but only a portion of its increases. 
To test the reliability of the BVDD, we have employed two econometric 
methodologies, namely a logit model and a semiparametric Cox model. For the 
purpose, we have used an unbalanced panel dataset composed by 863 Italian banks 




over the period 1996-2013. Moreover, to assess the predictive power of BVDD, we 
have also calculated Type I and Type II errors for the various model specifications.  
The main result obtained is that banks with higher BVDD are less likely to 
default. The evidence is robust to changes in model specification and to different 
empirical methodologies. The estimated coefficients sign and significance are 
robust also when controlling for other measures of stability and risk, i.e. ZSCORE 
and NPL, which proves that BVDD has some additional prediction power besides 
those indices.  
Regarding banks’ characteristics, we find that small, less capitalized and less 
profitable banks with a higher level of impaired assets are more likely to default, 
and that the banks’ business model and managers’ capability are crucial factors 
affecting the likelihood to fail. 
Concluding, the book-value distance to default appears to be a good predictor 
for banks’ probability of default and may therefore represent a useful complement 












Appendix 2.1. Tables 
Table 2.1 – Yearly sample distribution of failed and survived banks 
YEAR FAILED BANKS SURVIVED BANKS 
PERCENTAGE OF  
FAILED BANKS 
TOTAL 
1996 2 439 0.45% 441 
1997 2 623 0.32% 625 
1998 4 621 0.64% 625 
1999 2 597 0.33% 599 
2000 4 551 0.72% 555 
2001 7 525 1.32% 532 
2002 6 507 1.17% 513 
2003 1 516 0.19% 517 
2004 1 524 0.19% 525 
2005 2 503 0.40% 505 
2006 1 504 0.20% 505 
2007 4 507 0.78% 511 
2008 0 501 0.00% 501 
2009 3 517 0.58% 520 
2010 8 514 1.53% 522 
2011 17 498 3.30% 515 
2012 11 458 2.35% 469 
2013 8 433 1.81% 441 
TOTAL 83 780  863 
Source: Own elaboration on Bank of Italy data. 
  
Appendix 2.1. Tables 
II 
Table 2.2 – Yearly summary statistics for estimated lnBVDD 
 
YEAR MEAN STD.DEV. MIN MEDIAN MAX OBS. 
1996 3.9552 1.1190 1.3112 4.1132 8.3596 441 
1997 4.1536 1.0348 1.2203 4.2609 7.9747 625 
1998 3.9859 1.0744 -0.2396 4.1135 7.7084 625 
1999 3.9602 1.2262 -0.2941 4.0874 7.4004 599 
2000 4.0185 1.2106 -0.1505 4.0063 6.7359 555 
2001 3.7699 1.0269 0.1746 3.8863 6.6764 532 
2002 4.0108 1.0962 -0.0722 4.1527 7.1749 513 
2003 4.2828 1.2008 0.1367 4.3892 7.5315 517 
2004 4.4587 1.1695 0.1212 4.6221 7.2240 525 
2005 4.5765 1.1623 0.3523 4.7290 8.3636 505 
2006 4.5925 1.1604 0.4777 4.6793 9.5905 505 
2007 4.5595 1.1223 0.5006 4.7170 7.5271 511 
2008 4.4873 1.1697 -0.1329 4.7176 7.1496 501 
2009 4.2285 1.2551 -0.4735 4.4533 7.1189 520 
2010 3.9019 1.2644 0.0942 4.1110 7.2127 522 
2011 3.9099 1.3211 0.6148 3.9584 9.0247 515 
2012 3.5840 1.1719 -0.0041 3.6575 7.9223 469 
2013 3.4957 1.2003 -0.3564 3.6483 7.1379 441 
TOTAL 4.1112 1.2073 -0.4735 4.2628 9.5905 9421 
Source: Own calculations on ABI data. 
  




Table 2.3 – Summary statistics 




VARIABLE MEAN STD.DEV. MIN MEDIAN MAX OBS. 
lnBVDD 4.1112 1.2073 -0.4735 4.2628 9.5905 9421 
lnZSCORE 4.0930 0.9118 0.2384 4.0786 9.3035 9421 
NPL (1) 2.9128 3.2191 0.1001 1.8605 24.9993 9421 
EQASS (1) 11.3337 3.8856 1.1359 10.7824 50.1625 9421 
TOTASS (2) 2961.29 17398.41 6.7867 261.51 402143.8 9421 
LOANASS (1) 60.0610 15.0997 20.1969 61.1836 94.9725 9421 
NII (1) 15.4510 7.4460 1.1591 14.4980 86.2403 9421 
NIM (1) 3.1184 0.8942 0.3644 3.0562 7.9620 9421 
HHI 661.48 316.90 299.27 632.96 3698.48 9421 
GDP_PC 26.7244 6.3467 12.5971 28.2895 35.3464 9421 
GDP_GR 0.0023 0.0263 -0.4453 0.0067 0.2393 9421 
Appendix 2.1. Tables 
IV 
Table 2.4 – Summary statistics by failed and active banks 
(1) percentage; (2) mln eur, deflated to 2005 values. 
A t-test to verify whether the difference between average values for survived banks and 
failed banks is different from zero for all the variables is presented in the latter column.  
* Significance for the parameter estimates = 10% level. 
** Significance for the parameter estimates = 5% level. 
*** Significance for the parameter estimates = 10% level. 
In parentheses, values of t-statistics.  
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V 
Table 2.5 – Table of correlations 
 FAILED=1 lnBVDD lnZSCORE NPL EQASS lnTOTASS LOANASS NII NIM HHI GDP_PC GDP_GR 
             
FAILED=1 1.00            
lnBVDD -0.12 1.00           
lnZSCORE -0.17 0.25 1.00          
NPL 0.09 -0.17 -0.19 1.00         
EQASS -0.06 0.18 0.22 -0.04 1.00        
lnTOTASS -0.03 -0.16 -0.08 -0.14 -0.42 1.00       
LOANASS 0.03 0.11 0.02 -0.40 -0.21 0.32 1.00      
NII 0.05 -0.23 -0.10 -0.20 -0.24 0.52 0.39 1.00     
NIM -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.29 -0.46 -0.40 -0.50 1.00    
HHI 0.04 -0.17 -0.12 0.36 -0.14 -0.03 -0.24 0.01 0.17 1.00   
GDP_PC -0.03 0.16 0.14 -0.44 0.09 0.18 0.41 0.11 -0.27 -0.67 1.00  
GDP_GR -0.01 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.08 -0.08 -0.19 -0.13 0.32 -0.02 0.03 1.00 
Values in bold indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
  
Appendix 2.1. Tables 
VI 
Table 2.6 – Logit results 
Dependent variable: FAILEDit 
Standard errors are clustered at bank level. 
All regressions include fixed regional and time effects.  
* Significance for the parameter estimates = 10% level. 
** Significance for the parameter estimates = 5% level. 
*** Significance for the parameter estimates = 1% level. 
In parentheses, values of z-statistics. 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)  
lnBVDD -0.8263 ***  -0.9036 ***  -0.8214 ***        -0.5041 ***  -0.7886 ***  




       (-4.43)   (-7.22)  
lnZSCORE          -1.5492 ***     -1.3685 ***    
          (-8.85)      (-7.49)     
NPL             0.2387 ***     0.2297 *** 




 -0.2033 ***  -0.2319 ***  -0.7869 *  -0.2642 ***  -0.0713 




 (-3.76)   (-1.67)   (-4.06)   (-1.45) 








 (-5.58)   (-4.19)   (-4.70)   (-4.43) 




 0.0397 **  0.0255   0.0115   0.0214   0.0132 




 (1.57)   (0.58)   (1.25)   (0.71) 






 -0.0003   0.0224   0.0322 *  0.0096 




 (-0.02)   (1.27)   (1.84)   (0.54) 






 0.2656   0.4740 *  0.4923 **  0.3757 




 (1.09)   (1.79)   (2.01)   (1.45) 







 0.0006   0.0004   -0.0003   0.0004 





 (0.40)   (0.31)   (-0.23)   (0.30) 














































































 (0.00)   (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.39)  
INTERCEPT -1.5947 *  1.2717   0.8161   1.9997   -2.3649   2.2683   -1.5173  
 (-1.86)   (0.89)   (0.24)   (0.64)   (-0.68)   (0.70)   (-0.44)  




 83   83   83 
  83  
No. of banks 863   863   863   863   863   863   863  




 8920   8920   8920 
  8920  




 0.3816   0.2923   0.2923 
  0.3451  
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Table 2.7 – Semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model results 
All regressions include fixed regional and time effects.  
* Significance for the parameter estimates = 10% level. 
** Significance for the parameter estimates = 5% level. 
*** Significance for the parameter estimates = 1% level. 




  (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)  
lnBVDD -0.7664 ***  -0.8824 ***  -0.8256 ***        -0.5560 ***  -0.7644 *** 
 (-7.83)   (-7.70)   (-7.05)         (-4.47)   (-6.53)  
lnZSCORE          -1.4621 ***     -1.2930 ***    
          (-10.00)      (-8.57)     
NPL             0.2016 ***     0.1803 *** 
             (6.36)      (5.54)  
EQASS    -0.1877 ***  -0.2121 ***  -0.0589   -0.2288 ***  -0.0458   -0.1999 *** 
    (-4.49)   (-5.12)   (-1.55)   (-5.37)   (-1.14)   (-4.86)  
lnTOTASS    -0.7267 ***  -0.9612 ***  -0.6951 ***  -0.8623 ***  -0.7677 ***  -0.8757 *** 
    (-6.27)   (-6.50)   (-4.69)   (-5.70)   (-5.05)   (-5.81)  
LOANASS    0.0391 ***  0.0239 *  0.0099   0.2287 *  0.0129   0.0280 ** 
    (2.95)   (1.81)   (0.71)   (1.73)   (0.91)   (2.07)  
NII    0.0112   -0.0013   0.0266   0.0330 **  0.0108   0.0111  
    (0.76)   (-0.08)   (1.52)   (2.09)   (0.62)   (0.69)  
NIM    0.2202   0.3491   0.5440 **  0.4692 **  0.4497 **  0.3526  
    (0.98)   (1.59)   (2.49)   (2.17)   (1.97)   (1.58)  
HHI       0.0005   0.0002   -0.0003   0.0004   -0.0003  
       (0.34)   (0.11)   (-0.18)   (0.28)   (-0.22)  
GDP_PC       0.1266   0.0724   0.1213   0.1017   0.1608  
       (1.25)   (0.75)   (1.30)   (0.98)   (1.58)  
GDP_GR       0.9203   -2.3121   0.0436   -2.5179   0.4257  
       (0.13)   (-0.28)   (0.01)   (-0.30)   (0.06)  
COMM       0.5477   0.3537   0.5155   0.0960   0.1302  
       (0.86)   (0.54)   (0.85)   (0.14)   (0.20)  
BCC       -0.8140   -0.9420   -1.1270 *  -0.8980   -0.8923  
       (-1.25)   (-1.45)   (-1.83)   (-1.32)   (-1.36)  
BCP       0.8582   0.3620   0.3543   0.3701   0.5198  
       (1.31)   (0.55)   (0.57)   (0.54)   (0.79)  
Failures 83   83   83   83   83   83   83  
No. of banks 863   863   863   863   863   863   863  
No. of obs. 9421   9421   9421   9421   9421   9421   9421  
Pseudo R2 0.1767   0.2730   0.2929   0.3711   0.2724   0.3966   0.3283  
Proportional hazard assumption test  
χ2 23.83   29.77   42   53.45   38.85   59.42   38.82  
d.f. 38   43   49   49   49   49   49  
P-value 0.9647   0.9373   0.7504   0.3072   0.8502   0.1464   0.8511  
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Table 2.8 – Type I and Type II errors 
True positive: the model has correctly predicted the actual event of default; 
False negative: the model has failed to identify an occurred event of default; 
False positive: the model has indicated as failed a survived bank;  
True negative: the model has indicated as non-defaulted a survived bank.  
Type I error = FN/(FN+TP)  
Type II error = FP/(FP+TN). 
Numbers in parentheses in the first row indicate the model used to estimate the types of errors, according 
to Table 2.7. 
 
  
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
 10th quantile cut-off  
True Positive 52 61 63 69 59 70 66 
False Negative 31 22 20 14 24 13 17 
False Positive 890 881 879 873 883 872 876 
True Negative 8448 8457 8459 8465 8455 8466 8462 
Type I Error 37.34% 26.51% 24.09% 16.87% 28.91% 15.66% 20.48% 
Type II Error 9.53% 9.43% 9.41% 9.35% 9.46% 9.34% 9.38% 
 20th quantile cut-off  
True Positive 35 47 49 58 50 60 53 
False Negative 48 36 34 25 33 23 30 
False Positive 436 424 422 413 421 411 418 
True Negative 8902 8914 8916 8925 8917 8927 8920 
Type I Error 57.83% 43.37% 40.96% 30.12% 39.76% 27.71% 36.14% 
Type II Error 4.67% 4.54% 4.52% 4.42% 4.51% 4.40% 4.48% 




Appendix 2.2. The semiparametric Cox hazard model  
Consider a population of n individuals, banks in our case. A basic hypothesis 
of survival analysis is that default constitutes an inevitable event. Therefore, for 
each individual, only two outcomes can be observed, either the failure or the 
censoring (precisely, right censoring). In the second case, the default will occur 
after the censorship. Accordingly, given a time-to-failure and a time-to-censorship, 
the former is greater than the latter. 
Let T denote the time-to-default of a bank. T∈[0,∞[ is a random variable, 
which can be either discrete or continue. f(t) denotes its probability density function 










 ( ) ( )tTtF = Pr  (2.14) 
Hence, defining S(t) as the survivor function, i.e. the probability that the bank will 
survive longer than t, it can be written as:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )tTtFtS =−= Pr1  (2.15) 
Let λ(t) be the hazard rate, or age-specific default rate. It can be interpreted 
as the instantaneous risk of the bank’s disappearance in year t conditional on its 
existence up to time t. As it is a rate, it has units 1/t. The hazard rate identifies the 
probability that the default event happens in a given interval, conditional upon the 
observed individual has survived to the beginning of the interval, divided by the 
length of the interval. That is: 
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Appendix 2.2. The semiparametric Cox hazard model 
X 
The hazard rate is the object of the estimates, and it embodies a time-varying 
risk of bank failure. It must be non-negative, but no other constrain is necessary 
(λ(t)≥0) (Cox, 1972; Lane et al., 1986; Pappas et al., 2017). In actuarial statistics, 
λ(t) is defined as “the force of mortality”, while in economics literature its 
reciprocal is indicated as Mill’s ratio (Lane et al., 1986). There are several technical 
advantages in estimating λ(t) rather than F(t) or f(t); these are discussed in Cox and 
Oakes (1984) and Lawless (2003).  
The hazard rate can vary from zero to infinity, meaning that the risk can vary 
from no risk at all to the certainty of the failure event at a given instant. Over time 
it can fluctuate in several shapes. Given the relationship between the probability of 
surviving after a certain instant and the amount of risk that the individual has 
accumulated up to that instant, the hazard rate measures the degree at which that 
risk is accumulated.  
The hazard function shape is determined by the underlying process that 
determines the risk. Hence, when the risk of the event is zero, the correspondent 
hazard is zero. When the risk grows (reduces) with time, the hazard rate grows 
(reduces) with time. A typical example is the human mortality linked with aging. 
After birth, the function yields a dropping hazard, then a long plateau followed by 
a constant increase, until reaching values approximate to infinity at about 100 years. 
That is the risk of mortality is very high just after birth, then it quickly decreases 
and remains stable until a certain age. After this point, the probability of dying starts 
to increase and becomes nearly one around the 100th year. This form of hazard is 
called in jargon the “bathtub hazard”.  
Once one of the functions identified by (2.13), (2.14), (2.15) and (2.16) is 
estimated, the other three are fully determined. Especially, it is simpler to derive 
the probability density function ( f(t) ), the cumulative distribution function ( F(t) ), 
and the survivor function ( S(t) ) from an estimated hazard function.  
To demonstrate this, it is appropriate to define another function, namely the 
cumulative hazard function. The cumulative hazard function Λ(t) represents the 
measure of the amount of risk accumulated by the observed subject up to time t: 
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(2.18) 
Eq. (2.18) shows the relationship between the accumulated risk, Λ(t), and the 
probability of survival, S(t). Therefore, by considering (2.14), (2.13) and (2.15), we 
obtain: 
 ( ) ( ) ttS −= exp  (2.19) 
 ( ) ( ) ttF −−= exp1  (2.20) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )  ( ) ( ) ( ) tthtStS
dt
d
tFtf −=−=−== exp1  
(2.21) 
In case of left censored data, i.e. when one or more subject are not observed 
from the onset of risk but from t=t0>0, hence there can be cases of individual who 
fail during the interval from 0 to t0. In that cases it can be needed to deal with the 
conditional forms of the above functions, as follows: 
 ( ) ( )ttTt  = 0  (2.22) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )00 tttTt −=  (2.23) 
 

















tTtf =  
(2.25) 
(Lane et al., 1986; Cleves et al., 2010). 
Appendix 2.2. The semiparametric Cox hazard model 
XII 
Considering that each individual is identifiable by a set of variables x1,…,xk, 
which can be function of time, Cox (1972) defines the hazard as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )txxxtxxt kk 022110 ...expexp  +++==  (2.26) 
The Cox model provides estimates of the (k 𝗑 1) vector of β, but it does not 
provide any direct estimate of the baseline hazard, λ0(t) (Cox, 1972; Pappas et al., 
2017). Therefore, no assumption about the functional form of the hazard over time 
is required. The only hypothesis required is that the hazard function is the same for 
each and every subject. In other words, the hazard of a subject is a multiplicative 


















=  (2.27) 
and assuming xj and xm as constant overtime, the above ratio is constant as well.  
The Cox model results considerably advantageous when it is not possible to 
make any plausible assumption about the form of the hazard. Knowing the 
functional form of λ0(t), of course would allow more efficient estimates for 
βx. However, assuming a wrong hazard model would result in a biased estimation 
of βx. Therefore, a less efficient but not biased βx is preferred (Cleves et. al., 2010). 




Bank size and banking competition: some evidence 
from Italy 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, several countries have gone through a process of 
consolidation of their banking industries. The phenomenon has been fostered by a 
number of factors, among which an international tendency to capital markets 
liberalization and a massive technological progress that has notably upgraded the 
range of available services and distribution channels. As a result, competition 
among financial institutions has intensified and, to be part of the new global 
landscape, banks have been called for enhanced efficiency and supply 
diversification. Therefore, looking for economies of scale and scope, financial 
intermediaries have grown in size, and banking sectors have become more 
concentrated (Coccorese, 2009). 
In Europe, the consolidation stream has been accompanied with the broader 
process of harmonization, started in 1977 by the introduction of the First Banking 
Directive with the major aim of financial integration among countries. During those 
years, notable events occurred in Europe, like the liberalization of financial 
services, the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and the 
introduction of the Euro, considered as vehicles to achieve efficiency, 
competitiveness and a stable economic growth (ECB, 2011). 
As a European country, Italy has experienced both harmonization and 
banking sector consolidation, substantially changing its market structure. 
Considered as a support for development policies, the Italian banking sector 
has been employed for several years after the Second World War to overcome some 
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Italian issues, such as the economic divergence between north and south. It was 
intended as a tool to redistribute savings across regions and to provide credit to local 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through small and medium-sized 
institutions. As a result, the system was highly fragmented, overbanked and 
overspecialized. Moreover, it was strictly regulated, especially through branch 
opening limitations and credit quotas; public ownership of banks was quite 
widespread, and ‘special credit institutions’ (i.e. intermediaries entitled to grant 
medium- and long-term loans) responded to specific laws and were kept separate 
from the other banks (Monticelli, 1992).  
After the start of the deregulation process in the 80s of last century, the system 
underwent a series of reforms that have modified its structural shape. Credit 
constraints and lending restrictions were progressively abolished, public sector 
banks converted into joint stock companies, the formal separation between short 
and long-term lending institutions removed, and bank mergers started to be 
encouraged. Then, in March 1990, Bank of Italy abolished branch opening 
constraints (Jassaud, 2014; Beccalli and Girardone, 2016).  
The evolution of the Italian banking system continued also during the 
following decades. During the early 90s, two important regulatory framework have 
been introduced: the Second Banking Directive, implemented by the Italian laws 
through D.L. 481/1992 (Coccorese, 1998); and the “Testo Unico Bancario – D.Lgs 
385/1993”, i.e. the Italian banking regulatory pillar that replaced all previous 
legislation.  
Besides, in the first decades of the new millennium the country has been 
profoundly hit by the global financial crisis and the following sovereign debt crisis, 
which have engendered a sharp contraction of the system. Between 2008 and 2014, 
the number of banks fell by 17 percent, especially due to the exit from the market 
of intermediaries in difficulty and/or relatively less efficient. Moreover, bank 
employees and branches have decreased by around 17,900 (-5.6%) and 3,400 (-
9%), respectively. The drop has been larger for the five largest groups, which have 
also significantly reduced their market share in the same period. It is likely that the 
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decline of profits and the high capital requirements have encouraged the search for 
efficiency gains (Bank of Italy, 2015). 
In such a delicate period, an aid (albeit timid) to productivity has come from 
the technological development, which has allowed the arising of alternative 
distribution channels, such as internet, mobile and phone banking. 
On the same path, a couple of regulatory reforms have been introduced, one 
regarding the Banche Popolari (BCPs), in 2015, another related to the Banche di 
Credito Cooperativo (BCCs), in 2016. Their major aim is the improvement of 
efficiency and soundness of the system. In the case of the BCPs, the main objectives 
of the legislative framework are the increase in the ability to attract capital and a 
better diversification of investments in the sector, switching from a governance 
model based on mutuality to a more hierarchical form of organization. In the case 
of the BCCs, instead, the reform intends to promote a greater integration in order 
to maintain an adequate capitalization of the system, especially in the case of 
smaller institutions. In fact, one of the ultimate intents is to open the cooperative 
sector to the capital markets through the introduction of a new form of governance, 
the ‘gruppo bancario cooperativo’ (cooperative banking group) (Bank of Italy, 
2015, 2017). 
Some data clearly highlight the consolidation trend and the progressive 
increase of the sector’s importance occurred over time up to the beginning of this 
century: between 1989 and 2016 the number of banks reduced by more than 40%, 
dropping from 1,085 to 604; at the same time, the number of branches almost 
doubled, from about 15,500 to 29,000 (Bank of Italy, 1990, 2017). 
According to the last Annual Report published by the Bank of Italy, at the 
end of 2016 70 banking groups (comprising 129 institutions) and 475 independent 
banks were operating in Italy. Among these, 53 were commercial banks, 15 BCPs, 
325 BCCs and 82 branches of foreign banks. Italian banking groups classified as 
significant by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) were 14, and their assets 
amounted to the 74% of the total (Bank of Italy, 2017). 
<INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE> 
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As an important part of the European financial market, the Italian banking 
sector shares many features with other EU countries, such as France, Germany and 
Spain. It is a bank-oriented system, in which banks constitute the first funding 
resource for the industrial sector. Besides, an increasingly important shift from a 
system focused on a traditional intermediation toward a more service-oriented 
industry is occurring (Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2013).  
However, when compared with other European countries, Italian financial 
market appears quite narrow, as evidenced in Figure 3.1. For instance, in 2016 the 
domestic credit to private sector was about the 86% of the GDP, while in France 
was the 98% in Spain the 111% (Source: World Bank).   
Moreover, even though concentration has progressively increased over time, 
as highlighted by the Herfindahl-Hirshmann index that has tripled between 1989 
and 2013 (see Table 3.2), the system is one of the less concentrated in Europe, as 
shown by Figure 3.2. 
<INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE> 
<INSERT FIGURE 3.1 AND 3.2 ABOUT HERE> 
Despite the above-mentioned similarities, the Italian banking system is quite 
peculiar, especially in terms of diversification between intermediaries, due to both 
their dimension and their legal form. An important market share is held by mutual 
banks (BCCs), which hold around 40% of the total active branches. BCCs are small 
local institutions that play a primary role in providing financial services to small 
and micro businesses, as artisans. Founded on the principle of mutuality, their 
activity is focused on members, which are both banks’ owners and customers. 
Therefore, they enjoy a particular kind of market power that makes them more 
resilient to external pressure, often termed as ‘relationship lending’ (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994; Coccorese et al., 2017). 
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Relationship lending can be defined as a long-term contract between a bank 
and a borrower, by virtue of which the bank collects confidential information, hence 
creating a tie with its debtor (Elsas, 2005). It is a typical characteristic of systems 
in which industrial firms rely the most on banks for their funding, and the literature 
recognizes a number of advantages related to this kind of activity (Angelini et al., 
1998; Elsas, 2005). Among the others, borrowers are better able in finding credit, 
especially in case of opaque applicants, such as SMEs and households. On the other 
side, the financial institution is able to extract a greater value from the lending 
relations, due to the long-term rents it can exploit (e.g. Rajan, 1992; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995, and Boot and Thakor, 2000). Recent studies have evidenced that 
relationship lending has had relevant effects in tempering the credit contraction that 
followed the financial crisis in Italy, both in terms of credit availability and interest 
rates (e.g. De Mitri, 2010; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2014; Bolton et al., 2016). 
In the light of the profound structural changes occurred in the Italian banking 
system over the last decades, but also of the distinctive characteristics of the sector, 
understanding the evolution of the level of competition becomes a relevant issue. 
The importance of assessing the actual degree of competitiveness in the market 
appears crucial especially under a policy perspective. In fact, as we have already 
evidenced in Chapter 1, competition is commonly regarded as a goal to be achieved, 
since it involves a number of positive results, such as efficiency, innovation and a 
superior allocation of resources. However, the issue becomes controversial when it 
comes to banks, as the effects of competition on some features are not clear. Among 
these, we recall economic performance, financial stability and the transmission of 
monetary policy.  
Moreover, while empirical studies about the Italian banking sector tend to 
agree about the Eighties and the first part of the Nineties, detecting an increase in 
banking competition, results about the second part of the 1990s and the 2000s are 
not so clear. As suggested by De Bonis et al. (2017), the differences seem to be 
related to different time spans, empirical strategies and measures of competition. 
Recalling briefly the literature on banking competition in Italy, Angelini and 
Cetorelli (2003) have detected a constant trend of increasing competition over the 
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period 1984-1997, as indicated by the constant reduction of the Lerner index. They 
have also provided evidence that a remarkable increment was linked with the 
introduction of the second banking directive. 
Focarelli and Panetta (2003) have pointed out that the consolidation process 
occurred in the 1990s has led to a decline in interest rates on deposits and that the 
contraction was larger in the provinces with higher HHIs, thus indicating that the 
effect of market power was greater in more concentrated markets. Furthermore, by 
showing an increase in interest rates in the long-run, they have highlighted that the 
effects of consolidation were harmful in the short term, while positive in the long 
run. 
Analysing data between 1988 and 2005, Coccorese (2009) has highlighted 
that competition and concentration are not necessarily rival since banks acting as 
monopolist are able to exploit only a part of the estimated theoretical market power. 
De Bonis et al. (2017) have shown that competition among banks reached its 
highest level in the mid-1990s, after a long growing trend due to the liberalization 
process in the 80s. In contrast with some other results, they have also detected a 
decreasing trend after 1996. 
A slightly different point of view has been presented by De Bonis and 
Ferrando (2000) and Coccorese and Pellecchia (2013), who have analysed the 
Italian banking competition in the light of the multimarket hypothesis and achieve 
opposite results. The “multimarket contact theory” argues that, when firms compete 
with a same rival in a number of different markets, they are more likely to collude. 
Analysing the largest 55 Italian banks between 1990 and 1996, De Bonis and 
Ferrando (2000) have not found any support for the mentioned hypothesis. 
Conversely, Coccorese and Pellecchia (2013) have evidenced that multimarket 
connections increase market power, but are less important in more dispersed 
markets.  
In this paper, we estimate the Italian competition degree over the period 1989-
2013, both in the long-run and in the short-run, by means of the Bresnahan (1982), 
Lau (1982) and Shaffer (1989, 1993) methodology. The framework avoids any 
hypothesis on the relationship between concentration and competition, and requires 
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the implementation of a simultaneous demand and supply equations model, by 
which a conduct coefficient, called λ, is estimated. The latter represents the distance 
between the average perceived marginal revenue and the demand curve. Because 
the greater this distance, the more the market will tend to act as a monopoly (or a 
collusive oligopoly), the parameter can be interpreted as an index of competition.  
By using a panel dataset of 100 observations over the period 1989-2013, we 
are also able to split the time span into sub-periods. Thus, we observe the evolution 
of the parameter over time and evaluate whether possible modifications in the 
degree of competition might be ascribed to the changing regulatory framework 
and/or the structural modifications.  
Our main results show that the Italian banking sector is fairly competitive, 
that the level of competitiveness has substantially increased over time, and that 
small credit institutions are characterised by a higher level of market power. We 
discover a significant increase of competition after 1992, probably linked to the 
adoption of the Second Banking Directive (Directive 89/646/EEC), as well as a 
sudden drop in the period 2007-2008, which may be ascribed to the dawn of the 
global financial crisis. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 briefly reviews 
the main studies adopting our methodology, namely the conjectural variation model 
developed within the NEIO literature; Section 3.3 presents the theoretical model; 
Section 3.4 describes the econometric approach and data; Section 3.5 discusses the 
results; Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 The conjectural variation model: a literature review 
Albeit the level of competition of the banking markets has been often assessed 
through a structural approach, it is nowadays clear that firms’ conduct may be 
influenced also by factors other than concentration and market structure. 
Accordingly, the non-structural indicators of competition – developed within the 
so-called New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) – aim to directly measure 
the actual degree of competition of an industry, without any assumption about the 
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market structure. In such literature, the most employed non-structural measures of 
competition are the Lerner index (Lerner, 1934), the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic 
(Panzar and Rosse, 1987), and the Boone indicator (Boone, 2008).  
An alternative way for assessing competition is the methodological approach 
introduced by Iwata (1974) and developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). It 
assumes that the conduct of a firm affects each competitor’s reaction, and all 
decisions are made conjecturing such reactions. Therefore, the competition level of 
the sector should be estimated taking into account the interconnection of all market 
actors. 
By constructing a simultaneous demand and supply model, the method 
estimates a parameter that embodies the conduct of companies and then identifies 
the level of market power for each of them. The estimated coefficient, often called 
λ, can be interpreted in many ways. For example, Iwata (1974) interprets it as a 
conjectural variation coefficient, or in other words, as a measure of the rivals’ 
response to a change in the quantity produced by a firm (Iwata, 1974; Appelbaum, 
1979, 1982; Roberts, 1984). Bresnahan (1982, 1989) and Lau (1982), instead, 
define λ as the deviation of the perceived marginal revenue schedule of a firm 
operating in the industry from the demand schedule (Bresnahan, 1982, 1989; Lau, 
1982; Alexander, 1988). Defining λ as the conjectural variation elasticity, Shaffer 
(1983) demonstrates that it can be also interpreted as the percentage deviation of 
the aggregate output from the competitive equilibrium.   
The conjectural variation approach has been employed in a number of 
banking studies, especially in order to assess variations of the level of competition 
due to changes in the regulatory framework.  
Shaffer (1989) tests for collusion in the US banking sector from 1941 onwards 
and finds that the market has been historically non-distinguishable from perfect 
competition. The work uses industry aggregated data rather than national data. 
Shaffer (1993) examines the effects of the 1980 Bank Act revisions on the 
Canadian banking system by employing an aggregate time series of 25 observations 
from 1965 to 1989 and detects a shift from a competitive state to a 
“supercompetitive” state, i.e. a state where an excess of aggregate bank assets over 
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the competitive equilibrium level is offered. Moreover, these findings demonstrate 
that a competitive conduct is not incompatible with a high concentration: the 5 
largest banks accounts for more than 87% of all Canadian bank assets, but the level 
of competition of the sector is compatible with a Cournot oligopoly in which 250 
symmetric banks are active. 
Coccorese (1998) focuses on aggregate Italian data for the time span 1971-
1996, hence considering the consequences of the early European integration 
process, and observes a competitive behaviour.  
Neven and Roller (1999) develop an aggregate model for the European 
banking sector with data from 7 countries for the years 1981-1989. They show that 
banks’ behaviour has become less collusive over time, supporting the theoretical 
hypothesis that links such changes with the progressive deregulation (Vives, 1991).  
Examining panel data for city and regional banks in Japan from 1974 to 2000, 
Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) discover that competition has increased in the 1970s and 
in the former 1980s. The latter corresponds to the period when the secondary market 
for government bonds has arisen. Moreover, they evidence that city banks have 
been more competitive than regional banks. 
Here we aim at assessing the competitive conditions of the Italian banking 
industry by employing a slight modification of the parametric approach suggested 
by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), considering Shaffer (1989, 1993). Typically, 
the Bresnahan-Lau model is applied on time series of aggregate data, therefore it 
only estimates an average degree of competition for the market. Here, instead, we 
employ panel data. Specifically, we focus on dimensional groups, discriminating 
between big, medium, small and minor banks, as classified by Bank of Italy. Using 
panel data enables us to estimate various kinds of conduct coefficients: a long-run 
λ across the sample; some time-varying λ’s for the entire market; and four different 
firm-varying λ’s, one for each size group. In this way we can evaluate not only the 
temporal variations in the degree of competition, but also the differences between 
competitive behaviour of banks of distinct sizes. 
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3.3 The model 
According to the industrial organization theory, in the short-run profit-
maximizing firms choose the level of output (or price) where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost. The inverse demand function of a given industry can be 
expressed as follows:  
 ( ),, ttt YQPP =  (3.1) 
where Pt is the price, Qt is the aggregate output, Yt is a vector of exogenous variables 
affecting the industry demand (but not the marginal cost function), and α is a vector 
of other unknown parameters. Let now marginal cost be a function of quantity Qt, 
a vector of exogenous variables Zt (that do not affect the industry demand), and a 
vector of unknown parameters β:  
 ( ),, ttt ZQCMC =  (3.2) 
Since in a perfectly competitive market equilibrium price and quantity are 
identified when marginal revenue corresponds to the demand price, we can 
therefore write: 
 ( ) ( ) ,,,, tttt ZQCYQP =  (3.3) 
In case of perfect collusion, instead, recalling that marginal revenue 
represents the derivative of total revenue with respect to the quantity Qt, i.e.: 
 ( )













=  (3.4) 
the equilibrium levels of price and quantity are determined as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,,,,,, ttttttttt ZQCQYQPYQPMCMR =+==  (3.5) 
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where P’(*) is the first derivative of the inverse demand function with respect to 
quantity Qt .  















=  (3.6) 
Hence, P’(Qt,Yt,𝛼)Qt represents the semi-elasticity of market demand. 
Generalizing, for firm i at time t, the perceived marginal revenue is:  
 ( ) ( ), , , ,it t t it t t itMR P Q Y P Q Y q  = +  (3.7) 
where λit is a parameter lying between zero and one, which measures the 
competitiveness of oligopoly conduct.  
When λit is equal to zero, each firm acts as its perceived marginal revenue 
coincides with market demand. In other terms, they adopt a perfectly competitive 
behaviour, and price corresponds to marginal cost. Conversely, when λit equals 1, 
firms choose price and level of output in accordance with the industry marginal 
revenue curve. In this case, there is evidence of joint monopoly or perfect collusive 
conduct. Between the previous values, an infinite number of degrees of imperfect 
competition are defined, all characterized by an aggregate output lower than that of 
perfect competition (Lau, 1982; Coccorese, 1998; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2013). 
A negative λit, instead, would indicate a situation where marginal cost exceeds 
price, hence a deviation from the long-run equilibrium. In this case, the aggregate 
output would be higher than the competitive optimum (Gruben and McComb, 2003; 
Shaffer, 2004). 
Since a model with many different firms and time-varying λit would result 
over-parametrized, it is possible to overcome such shortcoming by switching to an 
aggregate λt for the industry, which can be regarded as an average value of the 
individual firms’ λit’s. Recalling that in perfect competition the output level of 
equilibrium is set by the representative firm where its marginal cost MCit  equals the 
market price Pt, which in turn coincides with the firm’s marginal revenue MRit, 
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it is possible to aggregate for the N firms operating in the market. Thus, Eq. (3.7) 
can be rewritten as: 
 ( ) tttttt QYQPMCP  ,,−=−  (3.8) 
Eq. (3.8) represents the price deviation from marginal cost, therefore from the 
optimal (competitive) price level. Considering now quantities, the difference 
between the industry output actually produced and the perfectly competitive level 











=− *  (3.9) 










Concluding, λ can be interpreted in different ways. First, it is a market power 
index (Coccorese, 1998). Second, it is a measure of the percentage deviation of the 
total output of the market from the perfect competition output (Shaffer, 1983). 
Third, as Bresnahan (1982) demonstrates, λ can be also regarded as the average 
firm’s market share in a Cournot equilibrium.  
3.4 Econometric methodology, variables and data  
In order to estimate λ, we design a system of two simultaneous equations: the 
first is a demand equation, the second is a supply relation meeting the first-order 
condition as defined by Eq. (3.8) (Shaffer, 1993). As already pointed out, since a 
model with firm-varying and time-varying λ’s would be over-parametrized, we 
need to estimate an aggregate λt for the industry, which represents the average value 
of the individual λit’s. The methodology does not require any particular definition 
of the market, however, the estimate of λ will be unbiased on condition that the 
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sample covers a complete market. Further, the hypothesis of an equal degree of 
market power for all firms is not required, as λ represents the average market value. 
Therefore, different behaviours can coexist in the same market.  
For the same reason, in an industry formed by more than one sub-market, λ 
will depict the average degree of market power if the sum of the different segments 
corresponds to the total market (Shaffer, 1993). This allows us to employ a panel 
dataset formed by different aggregations of banks, namely the dimensional 
aggregates defined by Bank of Italy. In this way, we can estimate not only a unique 
time invariant coefficient, but also group-invariant/time-variant and group-
variant/time-invariant λ’s.  
Further, as the estimates are conducted on a time series, λ would be unbiased 
as long as the average assets quality is stable over time, even if divergences across 
banks are allowed (Shaffer, 1993; Coccorese, 1998). 
For each dimensional group of banks j at year t we postulate the following 
semi-logarithmic demand function (Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2013): 
 
0 1 2 3 4ln jt jt t t jt jtQ a a P a Y a Z a MS = + + + + +  (3.11) 
where Qjt is the aggregate amount of loans. and Pjt the average loan rate. Yt is the 
national income (GDP), which controls for the level of aggregate demand, Zt is the 
interest rate of 1-year government bonds, proxying for the price of a substitute for 
bank loans, and MSjt is the share of loans of each dimensional group which allows 
to take into account the role of the groups’ size. Finally, εjt is the error term. The 
semi-logarithmic form avoids us imposing constant elasticities since they are not 
appropriate when using time-series data. Notice that the coefficient a1 is an estimate 
of the average semi-elasticity of demand with respect to price, i.e. 
(Q(*)/P(*))/Q(*), or also 1/(P(*)Q(*)).  
To write the supply function, we need the marginal cost equation. For this 
purpose, we start from a trans-log cost function with three generic inputs (deposits, 
labour, and physical capital) and one output (loans), a functional form that is widely 
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used in banking studies (e.g. Angelini e Cetorelli, 2003; Coccorese, 2005, 2009; Fu 
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Here Cjt and Qjt, are total costs and output of each group, respectively, W1jt, 
W2jt and W3jt are the exogenous input prices, and TIME is a trend included to capture 
possible effects of technological change over time that can shift the cost function 
(Zardkoohi and Fraser, 1998; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2013; Fu et al., 2014). The 
above cost function is consistent with the “intermediation approach”, according to 
which deposits are, jointly with other factors, an input for producing loans (Freixas 
and Rochet, 2008; Saunders and Cornett, 2013; Casu et al., 2015).  
By the symmetry condition, it must be bh,k=bk,h for h, k=1,2,3. Moreover, the 
cost function has to be linearly homogeneous, non-decreasing and concave in factor 
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Here W1jt is the price of funds, calculated as the ratio between aggregate 
interest expenses and total deposits, W2jt is the price of labour, computed as the 
average wage for employee, and W3jt proxies the cost of capital, through the 
overhead costs averaged by branch. Total costs, Cjt, are given by the sum of interest 
expenses, labour costs and overhead costs. All values are aggregated for each 
dimensional group j. 
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where 𝜆 is the parameter of interest and ϕt is an econometric error term.  
To sum up, the system of equations we are going to estimate is formed by Eq. 
(3.11) and (3.15) (Shaffer, 1993; Coccorese, 1998; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 
2013). As Lau (1982) demonstrates, in order to identify λ a necessary and sufficient 
condition is that the demand function (or its inverse) is not separable in one or more 
of the exogenous variables that are included in the demand function but not in the 













which clearly differs from zero. 
In our exercise, we estimate a different set of λ’s for the Italian banking 
industry over the period 1989-2013. Aggregate data are collected from the Bank of 
Italy. All economic figures have been transformed into real values by using the 
regional Gross Domestic Product deflator, with 1995 as the base year. Table 3.3 
provides some descriptive statistics of the data. 
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< INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE > 
In a first Model, called (1), λ is estimated as a constant over the entire time 
period. In Models (2), (3), and (4), we try to capture changes in the conduct of banks 
during time by using dummy variables accounting for different lengths of time 
periods. More in detail, in Model (2) we define 5 periods of 5 years, in Model (3) 8 
periods of 3 years, and in Model (4) 12 periods of 2 years.12 We also define an 
alternative framework that focuses on size differences. For this reason, Model (5) 
derives a behavioural parameter for each dimensional group, as defined by the Bank 
of Italy.13 
To estimate our simultaneous systems of equations, we use non-linear two-
stages least squares. Consistent with the existing literature, we employ all 
exogenous variables as instruments. Moreover, to cope with endogeneity of Qjt and 
Pjt, we also add their first lags as instruments. Other instruments are the overall 
number of banks’ employees and the national levels of consumption and 
investment, which proxy for different market characteristics. 
3.5 Empirical results and discussion 
Table 3.4 provides the empirical results for the various systems of equations. 
The upper part shows the estimated coefficients for the demand equation, while the 
lower part displays those related to the supply function. 
< INSERT TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE > 
                                                             
12 In order not to lose observations, in Models (3) and (4) the last period is one year longer. 
13 Bank of Italy classifies banks into five categories: major, big, medium, small, and minor. 
However, as the number of the major banks is on average very small compared with the other groups, 
we have aggregated the first two categories. Hence, we consider four groups of banks, termed as 
large, medium, small, and minor. 
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In the demand function all parameters are significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, as they are quite similar across specifications, and considering the high 
values of the adjusted R2’s, the equations seem properly defined. The negative sign 
of P (the price of loans) confirms that the demand curve is downward sloping. The 
estimated coefficient for Z is positive, meaning that the 1-year government bonds 
may be considered as a good substitute for bank loans. The demand elasticity of P, 
εQP, is always higher than the elasticity of Z, εQZ (in absolute value, calculated at the 
average point; see bottom of Table 3.4). Hence, as the cross-price elasticity is lower 
than the own-price one, banks are able to exploit product differentiation to soften 
price competition (Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2013). The coefficient for MS is 
significant and positive, indicating that groups of banks with greater market shares 
enjoy a higher loan demand. Similarly, as expected, loan quantity is positively 
correlated with the level of GDP. 
Turning on the second equation, i.e. the supply relation, the notably high 
values of adjusted R2’s seem to prove that the model is appropriate for the data. The 
coefficients of the variables constituting the marginal cost function are generally 
significant, except for lnW2W3, which is never meaningful. The estimated 
coefficients allow us to derive the values of the (average) marginal cost, which 
varies between 0.0768 euro and 0.0801 euro, depending on the model specification. 
As it is always lower that the average total cost of loans (amounting to 0.0910 euro), 
we can infer that, on average, Italian banks have been characterized by scale 
economies during the sample period.14 These findings are consistent with a large 
literature (e.g.: Altunbaş and Molyneux, 1996; Girardone et al., 2004; Coccorese 
2009; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2013).  
In the supply equation we also find the parameter measuring banks’ market 
power. Column (1) shows the estimated value of λ when it is considered as a 
constant over the sample period. Its value amounts to 0.0982, statistically different 
from zero at the 1% level; hence, the hypothesis of perfect competition can be 
                                                             
14 We are aware that the comparison would be more accurate if we use the estimated average cost. 
Unfortunately, our estimate of the marginal cost does not provide us with all the parameters needed 
to estimate the total cost function. 
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rejected. However, as indicated by the quite low level of λ, in the time span under 
inspection banks perceived their marginal revenue being only about 10% of the 
marginal revenue that would have been considered by a monopoly or a cartel. 
Therefore, we can reject also the hypothesis of a collusive behaviour, concluding 
that, on average, Italian banking sector has been a rather competitive environment 
between 1989 and 2013. A similar conclusion can be drawn considering that λ also 
represents the average market share in a Cournot equilibrium. In other terms, our 
market is comparable to a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with about 10 identical 
banks with an average market share equal to λ. Further, our estimated parameter is 
a measure of the percentage deviation of the actual total output from the perfect 
competition output, on aggregate.  
Figure 3.3 depicts the Italian loan market when considering Model (1) of 
Table 3.3, i.e. when λ=0.0982. 
< INSERT FIGURE 3.3 HERE > 
Point E corresponds to the estimated market equilibrium quantity, i.e. where 
marginal cost equals perceived marginal revenue. It is worth to notice that banks 
are fixing the equilibrium quantity where the industry’s marginal revenue is 
negative (MR=-0.0211 euro), suggesting that they are perceiving the market 
demand they face as inelastic. This result is coherent with our estimate of the price 
elasticity of demand, εQP, which on average is equal to -0.83 and lower than 1, on 
absolute value, for each estimated model (see bottom of Table 3.4). 
From Figure 3.3 it is evident that the market is neither a cartel nor perfect 
competitive. In fact, the first case would have implied joint profit maximization, 
hence fixing the quantity identified by point M, i.e. where marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue. In the second hypothesis, instead, the market equilibrium would 
have been indicated by point PC, namely the perfect competition equilibrium. 
Therefore, banks are not acting as price takers, since they perceive a distance 
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between their marginal revenue function and demand function that is represented 
exactly by λ.  
We now turn to the models accounting for time variant λ’s. In column (2), 
Table 3.4 displays the model considering 5 periods of 5 years (1989-1993; 1994-
1998; 1999-2003; 2004-2008; 2009-2013). Overall, the remarkable level of 
competition is confirmed across the years. However, the decreasing values of  
signal an increasing degree of competition. The major reduction (of about 34%) is 
detected between the period 1989-1993 (when λ = 0.1394) and the period 1994-
1998 (when it reduces to 0.0920). After a limited increase occurred between the 
second and the third period, a quite steady decreasing trend brings the estimated λ 
for the last 5 years to a level very similar to the one in column (1), i.e. 0.0965.  
The above results are consistent with those derived in Model (3), where we 
introduce 8 periods of 3 years. The presence of a good degree of competitiveness is 
again clear. Moreover, the narrower time windows allow us to better learn the 
decreasing trend of the conjectural variation parameter over the sample period. In 
column (3) two major changes in the level of λ are evidenced, one at the beginning 
of the new millennium, the second between the periods 2004-2006 and 2007-2009. 
In both cases, λ has grown by more than 25%, hence meaning an increase in the 
average banks’ market power (or a decline in the competitive level).  
Model (4) can help in disentangling the above trends even more accurately, 
since each period is now formed by only two years. Following the evolution of λ 
over time, this new specification indicates a trend that is less steady compared with 
the previous ones. In fact, five changes (among reductions and increases) are 
detected. A first contraction has occurred between the periods 1991-1992 and 1993-
1994. They confirm the change already detected by Model (2), which is consistent 
with an increase in the level of competition due to the introduction of the Second 
Banking Directive, occurred in Italy at the end of 1992 (Angelini e Cetorelli, 2003).  
A further drop is detected over the period 1997-1998, also persistent in the 
following span, hence indicating an intensification of the competition degree. In a 
speech to the Parliament in June 1999, the then Governor of the Italian Central 
Bank, Antonio Fazio, underlined two major changes that have had a notable impact 
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on the competitiveness of banks in the late 90s: the increasing market share of 
foreign operators; and the wave of privatization, which brought the market share of 
the public owned banks from 68% in 1992, to 42% in 1996, and to 17% in 1999.  
The Governor also pointed out other two events occurred in 1999 that, at that 
time, were considered as likely to bear future effects in term of competition. First, 
banks had been allowed to issue their products also outside their branches, for 
instance within commercial activities. Second, the euro had been introduced as a 
virtual currency (Fazio, 1999). Our data tend to confirm his previsions. 
Also in column (4) the new millennium advent is depicted as bearing a 
relevant decrease of the market competition. We need to recall that the euro – as 
cash – has been introduced in Italy on 1st January 2002. However, since we cannot 
split the two-years period, it is difficult to clearly understand the reason of the 
change. 
Just after a new decline in the 9th period, where λ reaches its lowest level, i.e. 
0.0973, a growth of about 50% is showed in the period 2007-2008. We believe that 
this fall in the level of competition is due to the global financial crisis and the 
connected slump in lending activity. It is also interesting to notice that, starting from 
2006, the competences in the field of bank competition have been transferred from 
the Bank of Italy to the Italian Antitrust Authority (AGCM). 
Column (5) focuses on the possible differences in market power among banks 
of different size. In this case, λ’s are estimated as time invariant coefficients, which 
however vary according to the dimensional groups. It comes out that bigger banks 
operate in a more competitive fashion compared to the others. Conversely, the 
groups of small and minor banks appear to be those with more market power. The 
results are consistent with the theory that recognize some market power to small 
local institutions, which, thanks to the deeper linkages with local economies and 
the existence of long-term relationships with borrowers, rely on information 
advantage (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Coccorese et al., 2017). 
Overall, our results are in line with previous studies on the Italian banking 
sector (Angelini e Cetorelli, 2003; Coccorese, 2008; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 
2013). They seem also not to support the Structure-Performance-Conduct 
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hypothesis for that industry (Bain, 1951). This paradigm states that market 
structure, affecting firms’ conduct, influences their final performance. Therefore, 
since more concentration is likely to induce a more cooperative behaviour, a less 
concentrated market should also be more competitive. Quite to contrary, for Italy 
we find that λ has a decreasing trend over the sample period (as shown before, 
especially by column (4)), hence implying an increase in the level of competition. 
At the same time, as already pointed out, the HHI has tripled between 1989 and 
2013 as a consequence of the consolidation within the Italian banking market.  
< INSERT FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE > 
As a final remark, also considering that the smaller the bank (on average) the 
higher its market power, consistently with previous literature (e.g. Berger, 1995) 
we can conclude that competition and concentration are not incompatible. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Since the 1980s, Italy has been characterized by a series of reforms, both 
national and at the European level, which have considerably modified the structure 
of its banking system. Historically characterized by extensive public ownership and 
stringent regulation, the sector has been thereafter progressively liberalized. At the 
same time, the technological progress has promoted the development of new 
products and distribution channels. Further, the contraction of profits and the high 
capital requirements mainly due to the recent financial crises have required an 
enhancement of the efficiency level. 
The process has implied some important consequences: on a first hand, a 
relevant process of consolidation, since financial intermediaries have expanded in 
size looking for economies of scale; on the other hand, a massive development of 
branch networks, probably due to the willingness of a better territoriality. 
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Some traditional theories, such as the SCP paradigm, predict that an increase 
in concentration should result in a decrease in the level of competitiveness of the 
banking sector, as larger banks would tend to collude and exploit their market power 
acquired through the consolidation process. Nonetheless, empirical studies have 
clearly highlighted an increasing competitiveness in the Italian banking sector 
during the last decades. 
In this paper we have empirically assessed the degree of Italian banking 
competition between 1989 and 2013 by appraising a conduct coefficient, λ, 
interpreted as a market power index. This has been done through a simultaneous 
equation model of demand and supply, estimated on a panel of aggregate data, 
which have allowed us to define both long and short-run competition. 
Our results generally confirm the outcome of other previous studies, 
evidencing that competition among Italian banks is fairly intense despite the 
consolidation trend experienced by the sector in recent years. More in detail, in a 
first model, λ has been estimated as a constant over time. Its value, equal to 0.0982 
and statistically different from zero at the 1% level has allowed us to reject both the 
hypothesis of perfect competition and perfect collusion for the Italian banking 
sector. We have also defined alternative models, in which the sample has been 
divided into sub-periods. All the different specifications have evidenced a 
decreasing trend for λ, hence involving an increase in the level of banking 
competition in Italy over the sample period.  
The evidence also highlights a series of changes due to different causes. For 
example, we have detected an increase of competition following the introduction of 
the Second Banking Directive, in 1992, and a very sharp contraction during the 
global financial crisis. Moreover, we have also recognized the remarkable effect in 
enhancing competition due to the wave of privatizations occurred during the 
nineties.  
When focusing on differences within banks categories, we have underlined 
that bigger banks tend to compete the most, and that small banks, instead, enjoy 
some market power. 
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To conclude, walking through a quarter of a century of Italian banking 
competition our results clearly highlight that an increase in concentration can be 
nonetheless compatible with a growth in the level of competition and that not 
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Appendix 3.1. Tables and figures 
Table 3.1 –  Structure of the Italian banking system 
Source: Own elaboration on Bank of Italy data. 













All banks Branches 
1999 
Banking groups     79  
Banks   208 641 849 27134 
of which: Commercial (SPA) … … 239 19978 
  BCP … … 49 4205 
  BCC … … 531 2862 
  Foreign owned banks … … 57 89 
2009 
Banking groups     75  
Banks   217 571 788 34036 
of which: Commercial (SPA) 191 56 247 26422 
  BCP 16 22 38 3068 
  BCC 9 412 421 4243 
  Foreign owned banks 1 81 82 303 
2016 
Banking groups     70  
Banks   129 475 604 29039 
of which: Commercial (SPA) 109 53 162 20544 
  BCP 10 15 25 3973 
  BCC 9 325 334 4352 
  Foreign owned banks 1 82 83 170 
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Source: Own elaboration on Bank of Italy data. 
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Table 3.3 – Summary statistics  
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum Median 
N. 
Obs. 
Q Total national loans (4) 202.77 170.42 31.33 818.02 144.48 100 
P 
Interest revenue / total loans 
(1) 
0.0933 0.0401 0.0418 0.1681 0.0777 100 
Z 
Interest rate 1-year 
government bonds (2)  
5.74 4.16 0.99 14.02 4.00 100 
Y Gross Domestic Product (5) 1.0556 0.0839 0.9064 1.1786 1.0865 100 
MS Loans share (2)  25.00 18.26 5.38 69.64 19.58 100 
C Total costs (4) 18.841 15.668 3.921 64.176 13.069 100 
W1 
Interest expenses / total 
deposits (1) 
0.0418 0.0209 0.0133 0.0842 0.0337 100 
W2 
Labour costs / number of 
employees (3) 
0.0604 0.0150 0.0008 0.0870 0.0616 100 
W3 
Other operating costs / 
number of branches (3) 
0.0097 0.0023 0.0049 0.0162 0.0095 100 
(1) ratio; (2) percentage; (3) million euro; (4) billion euro; (5) thousand billion euro. 
Variables are expressed at 1995 constant prices, over the period (1989-2013). 
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Table 3.4 – Systems estimation results 
 (1) 
 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Coef. z   Coef. z   Coef. z   Coef. z   Coef. z  
Demand equation – Dependent variable: lnQ 
Constant 2.4346 3.22 *** 
 
2.3091 3.04 ***  2.1942 2.88 ***  2.1964 2.89 ***  2.2352 2.93 *** 
P -8.9114 -4.15 *** 
 
-9.1128 -4.24 ***  -9.0576 -4.20 ***  -9.0911 -4.23 ***  -9.1019 -4.22 *** 
Y 1.9889 3.20 *** 
 
2.1024 3.36 ***  2.1982 3.50 ***  2.1989 3.51 ***  2.1648 3.45 *** 
Z 6.1796 3.16 *** 
 
6.6073 3.37 ***  6.7501 3.42 ***  6.7803 3.45 ***  6.7269 3.41 *** 
MS 3.8306 30.71 *** 
 
3.8301 30.67 ***  3.8321 30.65 ***  3.8255 30.62 ***  3.8305 30.63 *** 
Adj R2 0.9039    0.8994    0.8958    0.8903    0.9007   
Supply equation – Dependent variable: P 
Constant 1.0490 36.90 *** 
 
0.9959 24.38 ***  0.9873 19.69 ***  0.9728 17.14 ***  0.9455 18.13 *** 
lnQ -0.0468 -8.70 *** 
 
-0.0510 -9.02 ***  -0.0474 -8.07 ***  -0.0444 -7.75 ***  -0.0300 -3.27 *** 
lnW1W3 0.1178 8.44 *** 
 
0.1289 8.22 ***  0.1235 7.36 ***  0.1109 6.72 ***  0.1289 7.99 *** 
lnW2W3 -0.0054 -0.59  
 
-0.0043 -0.49   -0.0077 -0.90   -0.0071 -0.89   -0.0008 -0.09  
lnTIME -0.0382 -4.87 *** 
 
-0.0167 -1.70 *  -0.0243 -1.67 *  -0.0232 -1.15   -0.0417 -5.09 *** 
λ 0.0982 3.14 *** 
                
λ (1989-1993)    
 
0.1394 2.78 ***             
λ (1994-1998)    
 
0.0920 2.34 **             
λ (1999-2003)    
 
0.1050 2.89 ***             
λ (2004-2008)    
 
0.1025 2.94 ***             
λ (2009-2013)    
 
0.0965 3.12 ***             
λ (1989-1991)    
 
    0.1619 2.77 ***         
λ (1992-1994)    
 
    0.1427 2.92 ***         
λ (1995-1997)    
 
    0.1218 2.74 ***         
λ (1998-2000)    
 
    0.1030 2.87 ***         
λ (2001-2003)    
 
    0.1289 3.24 ***         
λ (2004-2006)    
 
    0.1056 3.07 ***         
λ (2007-2009)    
 
    0.1327 3.36 ***         
λ (2010-2013)    
 
    0.1030 3.31 ***         
λ (1989-1990)    
 
        0.1836 2.64 ***     
λ (1991-1992)    
 
        0.1964 3.07 ***     
λ (1993-1994)    
 
        0.1590 2.93 ***     
λ (1995-1996)    
 
        0.1575 2.94 ***     
λ (1997-1998)    
 
        0.1219 2.85 ***     
λ (1999-2000)    
 
        0.1111 3.02 ***     
λ (2001-2002)    
 
        0.1364 3.28 ***     
λ (2003-2004)    
 
        0.1322 3.33 ***     
λ (2005-2006)    
 
        0.0973 2.58 ***     
λ (2007-2008)    
 
        0.1452 3.84 ***     
λ (2009-2010)    
 
        0.1174 3.03 ***     
λ (2011-2013)    
 
        0.1055 2.79 ***     
λ (BIG)    
 
            0.0805 2.55 ** 
λ (MEDIUM)    
 
            0.1025 3.25 *** 
λ (SMALL)    
 
            0.1113 3.17 *** 
λ (MINOR)    
 
            0.1197 3.15 *** 
Adj R2 0.9942   
 
0.9944    0.9944    0.9954    0.9682   
N. Obs 100   
 
100    100    100    100   
𝜀𝑄𝑃 -0.8315    -0.8503    -0.8451    -0.8482    -0.8492   
𝜀𝑄𝑍 0.3546    0.3791    0.3873    0.3890    0.3859   
MC 0.0801    0.0795    0.0780    0.0768    0.0790   
The system has been estimated by non-linear two-stages least squares.  
The instruments used are: levels and logs of first-lagged Q and P; levels and logs of Y, Z, MS, average total costs, W1, 
W2, W3, number of employees, number of branches, consumption, investment, time trend; size group dummies. 
Elasticities are calculated at variables’ mean values. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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V 
Figure 3.1 – Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
Source: Own elaboration on World Bank data. 
Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector 
by financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and 
trade credits and other accounts. 










































Appendix 3.1. Tables and figures 
 
VI 
Figure 3.2 – Herfindahl-Hirshmann index growth 
Own elaboration on ECB data. 
Herfindahl index for Credit institutions total assets.  
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Figure 3.3 – Estimated demand, marginal cost, and marginal revenues for the 
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